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No One Owns Data 
LOTHAR DETERMANN† 
Businesses, policy makers, and scholars are calling for property rights in data. They currently 
focus on the vast amounts of data generated by connected cars, industrial machines, artificial 
intelligence, toys and other devices on the Internet of Things (IoT). This data is personal to 
numerous parties who are associated with the connected device, and there are many others are 
also interested in this data. Various parties are actively staking their claims to data, as they are 
mining the fuel of the digital economy. 
 
Stakeholders in digital markets often frame claims, negotiations and controversies regarding 
data access as one of ownership. Businesses regularly assert and demand that they own data. 
Individual data subjects also assume that they own data about themselves. Policy makers and 
scholars focus on how to redistribute ownership rights to data. Yet, upon closer review, it is very 
questionable whether data is—or should be—subject to any property rights. This Article 
unambiguously answers the question in the negative, both with respect to existing law and future 
lawmaking in the United States and the European Union, jurisdictions with notably divergent 
attitudes to privacy, property and individual freedoms. 
 
Data as such, that is, the content of information, exists conceptually separate from works of 
authorship and databases (which can be subject to intellectual property rights), physical 
embodiments of information (data on a computer chip, which can be subject to personal property 
rights) and physical objects or intangible items to which information relates (a dangerous 
malfunctioning vehicle to which the warnings on road markings or a computer chip relate). 
Lawmakers have granted property rights to different persons regarding works of authorship, 
databases, land, and chattels to incentivize investments and improvements in such items. 
However, this purpose does not exist with respect to data. 
 
Individual persons, businesses, governments and the public at large have different interests in 
data and access restrictions. These interests are protected by an intricate net of existing laws, 
which deliberately refrain from granting property rights in data. Indeed, new property rights in 
data are not suited to promote better privacy or more innovation or technological advances, but 
would more likely suffocate free speech, information freedom, science and technological 
progress. The rationales for propertizing data are thus not compelling and are outweighed by the 
rationales for keeping the data “open.” No new property rights need to be created for data.  
 
 † Lothar Determann teaches computer, internet and data privacy law at Freie Universität Berlin, 
University of California, Berkeley School of Law, and Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, and he 
practices technology law as a partner at Baker McKenzie LLP in Palo Alto. Opinions expressed in this article 
are those of the Author, and not of his firm, clients or others. The Author is grateful for valuable input, research 
and edits by Yoon Chae, Thomas Blickwedel, Paloma Pietsch and Shemira Jeevaratnam, as well as additional 
suggestions from Prof. Eric Goldman, Santa Clara University School of Law, and Tony Bedel. 
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Thoughts are free. 
Who can guess them right? 
They fly by me, like shadows at night. 
No one can mute them. 
No hunter can shoot them. 
It remains for all to see: 
Thoughts are free. 
(German folk song)1 
INTRODUCTION 
Connected cars, industrial machines, toys, and other devices on the Internet 
of Things (IoT) generate vast amounts of data and information. The total amount 
of stored data is expected to double every two years—meaning a 50-fold growth 
from 2010 to 20202—and reach 163 zettabytes by 2025.3 Autonomous vehicles, 
for example, can each generate as much as 4,000 gigabytes of data every day4 
on the vehicle’s performance and maintenance, location of the car, and various 
aspects of the people in the car5 with the help of today’s advanced sensors.6 
The explosive growth in the total amount of data will come from 
technologies that were both historically inside and outside of cars, fueled by the 
high level of forecasted interconnectivity of nearly all devices.7 Existing in-
 
 1. These are the lyrics of a German folk song. The lyrics in German are: “Die Gedanken sind frei, wer 
kann sie erraten? Sie fliegen vorbei wie nächtliche Schatten. Kein Mensch kann sie wissen, kein Jäger erschießen 
es bleibet dabei: Die Gedanken sind frei!” The original lyricist and composer are unknown, but the most popular 
version was rendered by Hoffmann von Fallersleben in 1842. Die Gedanken sind frei, DEUTSCHLAND-LESE, 
http://www.deutschland-lese.de/index.php?article_id=110 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (Ger.). 
 2. PETER FFOULKES, INSIDEBIGDATA GUIDE TO THE INTELLIGENT USE OF BIG DATA ON AN INDUSTRIAL 
SCALE 2 (2017), https://insidebigdata.com/white-paper/guide-big-data-industrial-scale. 
 3. DAVID REINSEL ET AL., DATA AGE 2025: THE EVOLUTION OF DATA TO LIFE-CRITICAL 3 (2017), 
https://www.seagate.com/files/www-content/our-story/trends/files/Seagate-WP-DataAge2025-March-
2017.pdf. 
 4. Patrick Nelson, Just One Autonomous Car Will Use 4,000 GB of Data/Day, NETWORK WORLD (Dec. 
7, 2016, 7:39 AM), https://www.networkworld.com/article/3147892/internet/one-autonomous-car-will-use-
4000-gb-of-dataday.html. 
 5. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, CAR DATA: PAVING THE WAY TO VALUE-CREATING MOBILITY 8 (2016), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20Insights/
Creating%20value%20from%20car%20data/Creating%20value%20from%20car%20data.ashx. 
 6. These sensors include global positioning systems (GPS), dedicated short-range communications 
devices (DSRCs), light detection and ranging (LIDAR) sensors, cameras, infrared sensors, and radio detection 
and ranging (RADAR) devices. UNIV. OF MICHIGAN, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SYS., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
FACTSHEET (2017), http://css.umich.edu/sites/default/files/css_doc/CSS16-18. They play evermore important 
roles in safety and technological advancements in vehicles and other connected devices today. See Lothar 
Determann & Bruce Perens, Open Cars, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 915, 920–21 (2017) (“Consumers select the 
make and model of automobiles with increasing focus on information technology feature: telematics, driver 
assistance, autonomous driving, connectivity, entertainment, and various safety features.”). 
 7. The number of devices connected to Internet of Things (IoT) will soon exceed the number of people 
on earth. G.V. Sam Kumar, Survey on Process in Scalable Big Data Management Using Data Driven Model 
Frame Work, 5 INT’L J. INNOVATIVE RES. COMPUTER & COMM. ENGINEERING 4468, 4469 (2017).  
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vehicle technologies, such as in-dash navigation systems, diagnostic systems, 
and virtual assistants already generate data and will continue to do so at an 
accelerated rate.8 Features such as voice controls will be used for more 
applications, while both video and audio will be recorded in more places.9 Use 
of biometric data will become more prevalent for authentication in various 
devices, including cars and other IoT devices,10 and technologies usually 
reserved for healthcare, such as heart rate monitors, will likely be incorporated 
into vehicles to assess the passengers’ health risks and ride comfort.11 
Various parties are actively staking their claims to data on the Internet of 
Things, as they are mining data, the fuel of the digital economy. The data 
generated is valuable to various persons and entities for different reasons, 
including safety, risk assessments, compliance, preventive maintenance, market 
intelligence, development of new business models, public policy, and law 
enforcement, among others.12 But much of the sought-after data will relate to 
personal and private information of various individuals (for example, regarding 
their health, travel history and speed, browsing history, and emails),13 which 
raises privacy concerns and questions of who may access and use the data 
generated by the various connected things. These questions are often framed as 
issues of data ownership or property rights in data in the popular press and 
political discussions.14 Businesses, politicians, and scholars assume the 
existence of, or call for, the creation of property rights in data.15 Yet, in the 
 
 8. See Matthew DeBord, Big Data in Cars Could Be a $750 Billion Business by 2030, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 
5, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/car-data-business-mckinsey-and-co-report-2016-10. 
 9. Lance Ulanoff, Nuance is About to Make Your Car a Lot Smarter, MASHABLE (June 22, 2017), 
https://mashable.com/2017/06/22/inside-nuance-next-gen-in-car-voice-assistant/#FfZi85Ms1SqO; see also 
MCKINSEY & COMPANY, MONETIZING CAR DATA: NEW SERVICE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE NEW 
CUSTOMER BENEFITS 35 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/ 
Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20Insights/Monetizing%20car%20data/Monetizing-car-data.ashx. 
 10. Matthew Crist, 5 Ways Biometric Technology Is Used in Everyday Life, M2SYS: BLOG, 
http://www.m2sys.com/blog/guest-blog-posts/5-ways-biometric-technology-is-used-in-everyday-life (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018); Salil Prabhakar, Why Biometrics Are the Key to Driver Authentication in Connected 
Cars, VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 7, 2017, 4:10 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/02/07/why-biometrics-are-the-
key-to-driver-authentication-in-connected-cars. 
 11. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 9, at 34. 
 12. David Welch, Your Car Has Been Studying You Closely and Everyone Wants the Data, Privacy & 
Security L. Rep. (BNA) (July 12, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-12/your-
car-s-been-studying-you-closely-and-everyone-wants-the-data. Data enables future business models as 
demonstrated by the convergence of car manufacturers, rental car companies, transportation businesses, ride 
share ventures and other “mobility providers.” 
 13. See MCKINSEY & COMPANY supra note 5, at 7 (using a chart to discuss the types of applications that 
consumer are willing to receive free service, in exchange for personal data). 
 14. E.g., Jeffrey Ritter and Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving 
Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 226–27 (2018); Evgeny Morozov, To Tackle Google’s Power, 
Regulators Have to Go After Its Ownership of Data, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2017, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/01/google-european-commission-fine-search-engines. 
 15. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2094 (2004); 
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63 (1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122–35 (1999); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM. 
ACM, Sept. 1996, at 92, 101; Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW. 
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context of this debate there is much uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the 
meaning of “data,” “information,” and “ownership;” little comprehensive 
analysis regarding how existing property laws already cover data or exclude data 
from protection; and relatively sparse considerations of legal and policy reasons 
for not granting property rights to data. 
This Article comprehensively examines and decidedly challenges 
assumptions regarding the existence or policy reasons for ownership rights in 
data and argues that data (1) exists separately from works of authorship, 
databases, and media (see infra Part II); (2) is largely free from property rights 
(see infra Part III); (3) is subject to a complex landscape of access rights and 
restrictions (see infra Part IV); and (4) implicates various legal positions, 
interests, and options for parties interested in the data that are regulated in a 
considerate, nuanced, and balanced fashion under laws outside the property law 
realm (see infra Part V). The Article then examines current policy discussions 
around the creation of a right to data ownership (see infra Part VI) and concludes 
that no one does or should be able to own data (see infra Part VII).  
The legal standards and frameworks employed in the Article are discussed 
from both U.S. and European perspectives to address the significant differences 
in transatlantic data privacy and data base protection law.16 To develop and 
illustrate these theses, the Article refers to the landscape of interests in data 
generated or processed by connected cars and other devices on the IoT, which 
are driving current economic developments and policy discussions, including 
calls from the German government for a statutory property regime assigning 
rights to data from cars to auto manufacturers.17 
 
U. L. REV. 1037, 1062–63 (1993); Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 968 
(2012); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic 
Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 11, 26–41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal 
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2381–83 (1996); James B. Rule, Toward 
Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and Institutions, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 183, 185 (2004); Herbert 
Zech, “Industrie 4.0”—Rechtsrahmen für eine Datenwirtschaft im digitalen Binnenmarkt, GRUR, Dec. 2015, 
at 1151, 1160 (Ger.); Karl-Heinz Fezer, Dateneigentum der Bürger: Ein originäres Immaterialgüterrecht sui 
generis an verhaltensgenerierten Informationsdaten der Bürger, BEITRÄGE, Mar. 2017, at 99, 99 (Ger.); Václav 
Janeček, Ownership of Personal Data in the Internet of Things, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 1039 
(forthcoming Oct. 2018). But see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 
1129 (2000) (“A property rights model for protecting personal data nevertheless presents many problems.”); 
Louisa Specht, Ausschließlichkeitsrechte an Daten—Notwendigkeit, Schutzumfang, Alternativen: Eine 
Erläuterung des gegenwärtigen Meinungsstands und Gedanken für eine zukünftige Ausgestaltung, COMPUTER 
UND RECHT, May 2016, at 288, 296 (Ger.) (discussing exclusivity rights to data—need, scope, and alternatives). 
 16. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 115 (2017) (discussing the differences in transatlantic data privacy law and the business reasons behind 
those differences). 
 17. Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, “Eigentumsordnung” für Mobilitätsdaten, 
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Publikationen/DG/eigentumsordnung-
mobilitaetsdaten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (study of the German ministry for traffic and digital infrastructure 
on whether data is or should be subject to property rights, concluding that property rights to data could be 
beneficial to create markets for data and to reward production of data and “essential investments”); Gerrit 
Hornung & Thilo Goeble, “Data Ownership” im vernetzten Automobil: Die rechtliche Analyse des 
wirtsschaftlichen Werts von Automobildaten und ihr Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der 
Informationsordnung, COMPUTER UND RECHT REPORT, Mar. 2015, at 265, 272 (Ger.) (examining property rights 
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I.  DATA AND INFORMATION 
In everyday parlance, the terms “data” and “information” are often used 
synonymously,18 referring to “facts about a situation, person, [or] event.”19 
“Data” and “information” are also used interchangeably in various legal 
contexts.20 Likewise, this Article uses “data” and “information” 
interchangeably, cognizant of different approaches to terminology in other 
academic disciplines.21 
Information can be or relate to diverse things, such as memories, thoughts, 
discoveries, insights, opinions, perceptions, fictions, or answers to questions.22 
Information can be stored in physical forms, such as human brains and data 
servers, or physically expressed in books or on road markings. It can also be 
communicated via smoke signals, blinking lights, measurable radio waves, 
digital cable connections, or writings on a wall. But the informational content, 
that is, data itself, exists separately from its context of a larger data base or work 
of authorship or its physical embodiment. For example, the informational 
 
and claims to data emanating from connected cars). 
 18. E.g., Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2018) (providing three definitions of “data” that all describe data as “information”). 
 19. E.g., Information, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/information (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (defining 
“information” as “facts about a situation, person, event”). 
 20. In the United States, for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act defines “medical information” as 
“information or data, whether oral or recorded, in any form or medium, created by or derived from a health care 
provider or the consumer . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i)(1) (2011). Under EU data protection laws, “personal data” 
refers to “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), art. 4(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 [hereinafter General Data Protection 
Regulation]. 
 21. Some data scientists use the term “data” to refer to discrete, objective facts or observations that are 
unorganized, unprocessed and without any specific meaning, and the term “information” to refer to data that has 
been shaped into forms that are meaningful and useful to human beings. Saša Baškarada & Andy Koronios, 
Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW): A Semiotic Theoretical and Empirical Exploration of the 
Hierarchy and Its Quality Dimension, 18 AUSTRALASIAN J. INFO. SYS. 5, 7 tbl.1 (2013). Data can thus be 
considered patterns with no meaning, whereas information refers to interpreted data that has meaning. Id. at 7; 
see also Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence: Speaking Law to 
the Power of Statistics, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 3 (2018) (citing Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Information in the 
Era of Data-Driven Agency, 79 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1–33 (2016)). For a discussion on further distinctions between 
“data” and “information,” as well as their distinctions from “knowledge” and “wisdom,” see generally Saša 
Baškarada & Andy Koronios, supra, and the illustrated discussion of definitions at 
www.datenschutzbeauftragter-online.de/daten-information-definition/. 
 22. Information, DET INFORMATIONS-VIDENSKABELIGE AKADEMI, http://www.informationsordbogen.dk 
/concept.php?cid=902 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (Ger.) (defining information as something that is “relative to 
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content of a smoke or light signal, photo or painting may convey a message that 
“a dangerous machine is approaching,”23 but this message exists separately from 
its tangible manifestation (the smoke signal, photo, or painting), any creative 
expression (the text or painting), and the physical means through which it is 
perceived (the human eyes, ears, or brain). 
Consequently, different persons could assert different rights and interests 
in (1) informational content (for example that a dangerous machine is 
approaching), (2) expression of information in words, symbols, paintings, or 
other works of authorship, or compilations or data bases in which information is 
organized creatively or functionally, and (3) physical manifestation of 
information (for example the smoke signal, photo, or the painting on a wall), as 
well as (4) the item to which the information relates (for example a 
malfunctioning autonomous vehicle or other machine). Ownership and property 
rights in these different aspects and embodiments of data or information are 
explored under different property law regimes in Part III. 
II.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DATA 
A.  OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
“Ownership” generally refers to “[t]he right to exclusive use of an asset”24 
or “the full right to dispose of a thing at will.”25 Ownership assigns a thing to a 
person or legal entity and signifies that the object belongs to that person.26 We 
also use the term “ownership” more broadly in everyday language with respect 
to owning an ability or responsibility,27 where one can “own up to” having done 
something.28 
In U.S. law, ownership denotes property rights, referring to a “bundle of 
rights allowing one to use, manage, and enjoy property, including the right to 
convey it to others,”29 as well as the rights of “exclusive use or monopoly over 
the property owned.”30 Similarly, German law defines “ownership” in reference  
 
 
 23. This informational content further comprises a factual assertion (for example, an animal is 
approaching) and an assessment (for example, the animal is dangerous). 
 24. JOHN BLACK ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 381 (5th ed. 2017). 
 25. 3 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BYZANTIUM 1545 (Alexander P. Kazhdan et al. eds., 1991). 
 26. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 1270 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010) (defining “own” as 
“[to] have (something) as one’s own; possess”). 
 27. Ownership, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/ 
english/ownership (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (defining “ownership” as “the fact of taking responsibility for an 
idea or problem”). 
 28. Own Up, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/own-up (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018) (listing the English definition of “own up” as “to admit that you have done something 
wrong” and listing the American definition of “own up” as “to tell the truth or to admit that you are responsible 
for something”). 
 29. Ownership, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2009). 
 30. Ownership, 2 THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 1931 (Stephen Michael Sheppard 
ed., desk ed. 2012). 
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to an owner’s ability to “deal with [a] thing at his discretion and exclude others 
from every influence,” as long as it does not come into conflict with “a statute 
or third-party rights.”31 
Correspondingly, “property” refers to “everything that is owned” or that 
“may be the subject of ownership.”32 Three main categories of property are real 
property (land or real estate),33 personal property (physical property other than 
real property),34 and intellectual property35 (intangible property based on 
ideas).36 
Property rights entail a set of rules that govern people’s access to and 
control of property,37 and the “bundle of rights”38 that the owner can hold against 
others, including (1) the right to possess, (2) the right to exclude,39 and (3) the 
 
 31. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 903 (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) [hereinafter GER. CIV. CODE]. 
 32. Property, THE LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2002) (online at Lexis Advance); see also Property, FREE 
DICTIONARY: LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/property (last visited Nov. 21, 
2018) (defining “property” as “anything that is owned by a person or entity”). 
 33. Real Property, Real Estate, or Realty, THE LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2002) (online at Lexis Advance) 
(“Real property includes land and any interest or estate in land.”); see also Real Property, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1412 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2009) (defining real property as “[l]and and anything growing 
on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land”). 
 34. Personal Property, THE LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2002) (online at Lexis Advance) (“Anything which 
is subject to ownership and which is not a freehold in real property.”); see also Moveable Property, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (Bryan A. Garner, 10th ed. 2009) (defining movable property as “any movable or 
intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property”). 
 35. Intellectual property refers to “[a] category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable 
products of the human intellect.” Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (10th ed. 2009). For a 
discussion on how intellectual property, such as trade secrets, copyrights, patents, and trademarks, also qualify 
as “property,” see Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of Theoretical 
Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 936–42 (2007). 
 36. See What is Intellectual Property, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018) (“Intellectual property (IP) refers to creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary 
and artistic works; designs; and symbols . . . .”); see also David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for 
Animals Within the Legal System, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1025–1026 (2010) (“The standard discussion of 
property today lists three basic categories of property—real property, personal property, and intellectual 
property. . . . Intellectual property is a product of a human mind.”). 
 37. Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 6, 2004), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/. 
 38. Other theories for defining property include (1) the exclusivity theory, which holds that exclusivity 
rights are the sole requirement for property, and (2) the integrated theory, which states that exclusivity is not 
enough and looks at how the asset is acquired, used, and disposed. Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade 
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2007). In contrast, this Article prefers the bundle of rights 
theory to address ownership and property rights in data, as it provides more flexibility for addressing data 
ownership under different property law regimes. See id. at 18 (“The middle ground is . . . ‘Hohfeldian’ bundle 
of rights.”). 
 39. J. E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 (1996) (“[T]he 
‘incidents’ of ownership . . . [includes] the right to possess, the right to use, the right to capital, the liability to 
execution, the immunity from expropriation, and so on.”); Property Rights, 2 THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER 
LAW DICTIONARY 2237 (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., desk ed. 2012) (referring to property rights as “the 
rights of ownership, possession, and use of lands, things, and ideas, including intellectual property”); RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 35–104 (1985) (explaining 
that the “bundle of rights” approach has become the standard starting point for an inquiry into the nature of 
property); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“[T]he owners has somehow lost one of the 
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right to transfer.40 Among the three, the right to exclude is described as “one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property.”41 
Contracts, torts, competition, and penal laws can also convey exclusion 
rights, but not a complete bundle of rights that amounts to ownership. Contracts 
can mimic all rights typically conferred by property laws, but create rights and 
obligations only between contracting parties and named beneficiaries. 
Companies often agree in contracts that one party shall own certain data. But, 
such an agreement binds only other contracting parties and not anyone else, and 
can thus not convey actual property rights. Torts, competition, and penal laws 
can generally prohibit data access or use except by authorized persons and thus 
create de facto exclusion rights.42 But, torts, competition, and penal laws are 
limited to prohibitions and do not convey rights to possession, access, use, and 
alienability to the authorized person who is exempt from the prohibitions; such 
laws are intended to prohibit conduct that is harmful to society, business 
integrity, or individual freedoms and stop short of creating property. 
Governments grant ownership and property rights primarily for utilitarian 
or economic incentive reasons.43 Property rights are therefore granted to 
 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude 
others.”). 
 40. Tom W. Bell, “Property” in the Constitution: The View from the Third Amendment, 20 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1243, 1250 (2012) (“Unless ‘property’ comes with a limiting adjective, then, it covers anything of 
value subject to an owner’s exclusive rights of use and transfer.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right 
to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“Of course, those who are given the right to exclude others from 
a valued resource typically also are given other rights with respect to the resource—such as the right[] . . . to 
transfer it . . . .”). 
 41. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 176; see also Merrill, supra note 40, at 730 (“[T]he right to exclude others is more 
than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”). The United States 
Supreme Court has also focused on the right to exclude in its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or 
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 353 (2009); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) 
(discussing that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence used to be tied to common-law trespass, but that 
its later cases have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach). 
 42. For example, laws like the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other computer interference laws, 
unfair competition laws, data privacy laws, trade secret laws and database protection laws create a de facto 
exclusion right. 
 43. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th 
ed. 2012) (“Utilitarian theory, and the economic framework built upon it, has long provided the dominant 
paradigm for analyzing and justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection.”); see also Peter 
Horsley, Property Rights Viewed from Emerging Relational Perspectives, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 87, 89–90 (David 
Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011) (“Property rights encourage property holders to develop their property, 
generate wealth, and efficiently allocate resources based on the operation of the market.”); Eric A. Posner & E. 
Glen Weyl, Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 51, 51 (2017) (“Property rights 
of all sorts—in real estate, in shares of corporations, and in radio spectrum, to take three diverse examples—
give the owner a monopoly over a resource. It is conventional to think that this monopoly is benign. It gives the 
owner an incentive to invest in improving the property because she receives the entire payoff from its use or 
sale. This aligns social and private incentives for investment in property.”). Other theories for justifying property 
rights are the natural rights perspective, as advanced by John Locke in Two Treatises on Government, and the 
personhood justification, as developed by Georg Wilheim Freidrich Hegel in Philosophy of Right. For further 
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incentivize creations or improvements of property, such as farm land (real 
property) and chattels (personal property),44 as well as various intangibles,45 
including works of authorship (copyrights),46 brands (trademarks), and 
inventions (patents).47 For these types of creations, in which the real value lies 
in their intangible aspects, governments grant property rights to reward and 
incentivize the creators and inventors by allowing them to monetize their 
creations and exclude their competitors (or make them license the rights for a 
fee or rent).48 
 
discussions on the natural rights perspective, see Donna M. Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 
NEB. L. REV. 700, 705–15 (1999); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 
73 (1985) (analyzing the flaws in Locke’s theory that “original owner is one who mixes his or her labor with a 
thing and, by commingling that labor with the thing, establishes ownership of it”); and Waldron, supra note 37, 
at 10 (comparing Locke’s theory of property rights with David Hume’s theory of rights). For further discussions 
on the personhood justification, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–
77 (1982). 
 44. See GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, § 953 (stating that property rights are granted to the owner of the 
thing, for example in § 99, fruits of property belong to the owner of the original property); CAL. CIV. CODE § 658 
(West 2018) (generally granting property rights in crops to the owner of the land). 
 45. See Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, para. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45, 46 (“The protection of intellectual 
property is important not only for promoting innovation and creativity, but also for developing employment and 
improving competitiveness.”); Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, para. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45, 46 (“The protection of 
intellectual property should allow the inventor or creator to derive a legitimate profit from his invention or 
creation. It should also allow the widest possible dissemination of works, ideas and new know-how. At the same 
time, it should not hamper freedom of expression, the free movement of information, or the protection of 
personal data, including on the Internet.”). 
 46. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 654–1422 (West 2018); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012); GER. CIV. CODE, 
supra note 31, §§ 903–1011; Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, 
BGBL. I at 1273, last amended Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL. I at 3346, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html (Ger.) [hereinafter German Copyright Act]. 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL. 
I at 1, last amended Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL. I at 3346, translation at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=401424 (Ger.) (“Patents shall be granted for any inventions, in 
all fields of technology, provided that they are new . . . .”). The four major economic justifications for patent 
law, according to a 1966 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System, are that the patent system: 
(1) provides an incentive to invent, (2) stimulates the investment of additional capital needed for the further 
development and marketing of the invention, (3) encourages early public disclosure of technological 
information, and (4) promotes the beneficial exchange of products, services, and technological information. 
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 17–18 (citing COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE U.S. SENATE, 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 2 (1966)). 
 48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to enact copyright laws in order to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) (“Society may give an exclusive right 
to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this 
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As governments extend property rights to reward investment and 
innovation, they must also consider various conflicting interests of the public. 
Property laws need to evolve in pace with societal and technological changes.49 
The arising rights should be granted only if they do not come into conflict with 
existing laws and third-party rights.50 The rights to use and exclude are thus 
restricted in various ways. For example, landowners’ rights are limited by the 
right of way for neighbors under certain circumstances,51 and their rights to use 
are further limited by land development regulations, gun control laws, and traffic 
rules, among others.52 
Proper limits need to be established for intellectual property laws as well. 
Although designed to incentivize investments for the greater good, such as for 
stimulating scientific and technological progress or developing the fine arts, 
exclusivity rights that are granted too broadly or for too long can actually impair 
the desired progress.53 This is why limitations, carve-outs, and exceptions have 
been set for intellectual property rights, so that a balance can be established 
between the interests of innovators and of the wider public. Data is typically one 
of the carve-outs from protectable subject matter definitions in intellectual 




 49. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Arresting 
the development of the common law is not only a departure from our prior decisions; it is also profoundly unwise. 
The human condition is one of constant learning and evolution—both moral and practical. Legislatures 
implement that new learning; in doing so they must often revise the definition of property and the rights of 
property owners.”). 
 50. See GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, § 903 (“[O]wner of a thing may, to the extent that a statute or 
third-party rights do not conflict with this, deal with the thing at his discretion and exclude others from every 
influence.” (emphasis added)). 
 51. See, e.g., GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, § 917(1) (“If a plot of land lacks the connection to a public 
road necessary for the due use, the owner may require of the neighbors that until the defect is removed they 
tolerate the use of their plots of land to create the necessary connection.”); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009 
(West 2018) (“It is in the best interests of the state to encourage owners of private property to continue to make 
their lands available for public recreational use to supplement opportunities available on tax-supported publicly 
owned facilities.”). 
 52. See GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, § 903 (“The owner of an animal must, when exercising his powers, 
take into account the special provisions for the protection of animals.”); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3342(a) (“The 
owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public 
place or lawfully in a private place.” emphasis added)). 
 53. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405, 417 (2012) (“In that context, separating protectable expression from 
nonprotectable idea often proceeds as a policy determination inquiring into whether an asset is so abstract that 
subjecting it to exclusive rights would effectively impair rather than advance creative progress.”); Defend 
Innovation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://web.archive.org/web/20151222074452/https:// 
defendinnovation.org/proposals (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (asserting that a “patent covering software should 
be shorter: no more than five years from the application date” so that the patent system can defend innovation, 
instead of hindering it). 
 54. Patent law excludes laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas from patentable subject 
matter. Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–71 (2012). Trademark law denies 
protection for generic marks. Park ‘n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). Copyright law 
excludes facts and ideas from copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
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Yet, various existing property law regimes implicate data and information 
in different aspects, forms, and scenarios, as discussed in the subsequent sections 
of Part III, although none of those regimes grant any effective ownership or 
property rights in the data itself. The subsequent sections of Part III also explore 
the popular justifications and legal frameworks for property rights under each 
property law regime to provide the analytical framework for assessing potential 
policy reasons for creating new property rights in data. 
B. REAL PROPERTY 
Real property laws may grant ownership rights to physical manifestations 
of information that attach to real property, but do not provide any ownership 
rights to the underlying information itself. Real property laws are designed to 
protect land, anything that grows on the land, anything permanently attached to 
the land, or any structure erected on it, including crops, mines, roads, and 
machinery.55 Owners are entitled to the real property’s access, use, possession, 
enjoyment, disposition, and exclusion of others (trespassers),56 as well as to 
harvest its crops, fruits, game, water, and minerals. These ownership rights, 
however, are limited in different aspects. For example, the owner must comply 
with building codes and obtain the required permits and approvals,57 and may  
 
 
 55. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 658 (West 2018) (“Real or immovable property consists of: l. Land; 2. That 
which is affixed to land; 3. That which is incidental or appurtenant to land; 4. That which is immovable by law; 
except that for the purposes of sale, emblements, industrial growing crops and things attached to or forming part 
of the land, which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale, shall be treated as goods 
and be governed by the provisions of the title of this code regulating the sales of goods.”); id. § 659 (“Land is 
the material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or other 
substance, and includes free or occupied space for an indefinite distance upwards as well as downwards, subject 
to limitations upon the use of airspace imposed, and rights in the use of airspace granted, by law.”); id. §§ 661, 
662 (discussing fixtures and appurtenances); see also GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, § 946 (“If a movable thing 
is combined with a plot of land in such a way that it becomes an essential part of the plot of land, the ownership 
of the plot of land extends to this movable thing.”); id. § 94 (“(1) The essential parts of a plot of land include the 
things firmly attached to the land, in particular buildings, and the produce of the plot of land, as long as it is 
connected with the land. Seed becomes an essential part of the plot of land when it is sown, and a plant when it 
is planted. (2) The essential parts of a building include the things inserted in order to construct the building.”); 
id. §§ 873–902 (providing general provisions on rights in land); id. §§ 925–928 (discussing acquisition and loss 
of ownership of plots of land); see also Story v. Christin, 95 P.2d 925, 926 (Cal. 1939) (“The ancient law rigidly 
applied the maxim quicquid plantatur solo cedit and held that whatever was attached to land in any manner 
whatsoever was part of the land. This rule was applied to plants and trees growing in soil and also to buildings 
and other products of man’s labor.”); Kindig v. Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n, 91 P.2d 645, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1939). 
 56. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987); Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on 
the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 253, 255, 262; see also City of W. Bend v. Cont’l IV Fund Ltd. P’ship, 
535 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 57. See, e.g., New Houses, Additions & Remodeling, CITY OF SAN MARINO CALIFORNIA, 
https://www.cityofsanmarino.org/284/New-Houses-Additions-Remodeling (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) 
(requiring additions to undergo approval); GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, STATE OF CAL., 
PLANNING, ZONING, AND DEVELOPMENT LAWS 6–10 (2012), http://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/PZD2012.pdf (listing 
building requirements).  
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have to grant access to her neighbors or the public under certain circumstances.58 
Likewise, the law can limit an owner’s ability to extract water, oil, and minerals 
if a use affects the environment or his neighbors.59 
Real property laws grant rights to owners with respect to physical 
manifestations of information that attach to the real property (for example 
warnings carved in stone or a tree, paintings in a cave or on a house, or zebra 
crossing lines painted on a road), subject to the aforementioned restrictions. The 
owner of such physical manifestations of information would have the same 
rights as to the real property itself, including the rights to possess and exclude 
others from trespassing on the physical embodiment of information (for 
instance, an owner can prohibit others from parking cars on road segments 
marked with “no parking” lines). But, real property laws do not grant rights to 
possess or control data about real property.60 A landowner cannot assert property 
rights to prohibit others from depicting the location of a zebra road crossing on 
a map or take a photo of the road markings, or demand access to maps or photos 
based on ownership of land depicted. Real property ownership does not extend 
to the informational content, and no ownership rights arise for data as such based 
on real property laws. 
Data is thus not covered by real property laws as protectable subject matter, 
and real property owners do not have any right to exclude others from accessing, 
using, reproducing, or distributing the informational content that exists within 
physical items on their real property. 
C. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Personal property laws can grant ownership rights to physical 
manifestations of information, but do not provide any ownership rights to the 
underlying information. This is because personal property laws cover physical 
things (other than real estate). For example, the German Civil Code expressly 
limits personal property law61 to tangible things.62 California property law 
defines personal property as “every kind of property that is not real [property]”63 
and courts have required a connection to physical items.64 An owner of a 
 
 58. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009(a)(1) (West 2018); see also GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, § 917(1) 
(requiring landowners to allow their neighbors to cross their land if no other connection to a public road exists); 
Waldgesetz für Bayern [BayWaldG], GVBI § 313, BayRS 7902-1-L, art. 13(1) (2005) (Ger.) (creating a public 
right to access forest lands). 
 59. See generally 30 C.F.R. § 250 (2018) (discussing U.S. federal guidelines for oil, gas, and sulphur 
operations on the Outer Continental Shelf). 
 60. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 8774 (West 2018), for a discussion on California law granting a “right 
of entry” on property to collect information about borders and location of real property. 
 61. See GER. CIV. CODE, supra note 31, §§ 929–984. 
 62. See id. (limiting personal property to “moveable things”). 
 63. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 663 (West 2018). 
 64. See Estate of Puett, 1 Cal.2d 131, 134 (Cal. 1934) (citing Bills v. Putnam, 64 N.H. 554 (N.H. 1888) for 
the proposition that personal property embraced goods and chattel only); see also PERSONS, PARTS AND 
PROPERTY: HOW SHOULD WE REGULATE HUMAN TISSUE IN THE 21ST CENTURY? 91 (Imogen Goold et al. eds., 
2014) (“All clear property rights, in addition to being exigible against the world, have a second characteristic of 
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physical item that embodies information—such as a book, photo, or computer 
chip—can thus enforce property rights to the physical item that embodies data 
(she can exclude others from taking a computer chip or demand return of a 
book),65 but cannot exclude others from apprehending, using, reproducing, 
disclosing, or displaying the information contained within the physical item (that 
is, she cannot exclude others from the informational content). 
D. TRADE SECRET 
At first sight, trade secret laws may appear to come close to granting 
ownership rights to data, but these laws have limitations that prevent them from 
effectively granting property rights to data. In the United States, trade secret law 
originated from the common law, but has now been codified in state statutes66 
that resemble the Uniform Trade Secrets Act67 and federal law, including the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.68 Businesses can claim protection for 
technical know-how, customer lists, and other information as trade secrets if that 
information (1) is not generally known or readily accessible, (2) derives an 
economic value from being secret, and (3) has been subject to reasonable steps 
to be kept as a secret.69 
Whether such protection falls within the property law regime is subject to 
controversy.70 In the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Congress expressly 
stated that the Act “shall not be construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual 
property.”71 Trade secrets are protected against misappropriation by way of 
 
relating to a physical thing.”). 
 65. Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the Data?, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695, 737–38 (2006) (“Even if the manufacturer does not own the data directly—
whether because the data is not subject to ownership by anyone, or because the manufacturer is not the creator 
of the data or otherwise directly owner of the intangible property—the manufacturer may be able to control the 
data because it owns the chip in the tag. Given that the chip (and the antenna) is a piece of tangible, personal 
property, traditional rules regarding ownership of the chip would apply.”). 
 66. Risch, supra note 38, at 6.  
 67. See Smith, supra note 65, at 722. 
 68. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also Lothar Determann et al., Trade Secret Protection Measures and New 
Harmonized Laws, 17 COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L 179, 179 (2016). 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)–(B) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.1(d), 3426.11 (West 2018); Directive 
(EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed 
Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, 
art. 2(1), 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, 9 (establishing a similar framework of trademark rules to be provided by the EU 
Member States); see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 25 (“The definition of subject matter eligible for 
protection is quite broad: business or technical information of any sort. To benefit from trade secret protection, 
the information must be a secret.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 38, at 15 (“To many, if trade secrets are property, then laws protecting them 
are normatively justified. Thus, the question of whether or not trade secrets are property has raged on for many 
years.”). 
 71. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153 § 2(g), 130 Stat. 376 (2016). Section 2(g) of 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act is apparently intended primarily to maintain the status quo under section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act. Eric Goldman, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Isn’t an “Intellectual 
Property” Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J., 541, 541–42 (2017) (“[T]he odd and unprecedented 
declaration that the DTSA ‘shall not be construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property.’ . . . preserves 
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espionage or breach of contract.72 The goal of trade secret law is not to 
incentivize citizens or companies to keep information secret, but to protect 
business integrity from unfair misappropriation of valuable confidential 
information.73 In Germany, trade secret protection has also historically been cast 
as a prohibition against unfair competition, and not as a property right.74 Further, 
trade secrets do not provide “exclusive” rights,75 and the legal protections 
available for trade secrets are less concrete than those for real, personal, and 
other intangible properties.76 For example, information immediately loses 
protection under trade secret laws if it becomes public via independent discovery 
or reverse engineering in the interest of innovation77—in other words, the 
moment the information no longer qualifies as a secret.78 Trade secret laws are 
thus more akin to traditional tort law than to property law (for example, patent 
or copyright law).79 





the status quo for 47 U.S.C. § 230 . . . .” (quoting Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(g), 
130 Stat. 376 (2016))). 
 72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832, 1839(6)(A) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.1–3426.11 (West 2018). 
 73. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 25 (“Trade secret laws are state law doctrines that protect against 
the misappropriation of certain confidential information.”); id. at 37 (“On eligible subject matter, the current 
trend, exemplified once again by the UTSA, is to protect as a trade secret any valuable information so long as 
the information is capable of adding economic value . . . .”). 
 74. See Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] [Act Against Unfair Competition], Mar. 3, 2010, 
BGBL. I at 254, last amended Feb. 17, 2016, BGBL. I at 233, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_uwg/englisch_uwg.pdf (Ger.) (“This Act shall serve the purpose of protecting competitors, 
consumers and other market participants against unfair commercial practices.” (emphasis added)). 
 75. See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (2010). 
 76. See Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 398 (1989) (“Clearly, the word property is a 
very powerful metaphor that radically changes the stakes in legal disputes. Once a property interest is 
established, the law provides a wide range of legal protections for it, a much wider range . . . [than for] other 
specific kinds of unfair conduct.”). 
 77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (2012); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) 
(defining “reverse engineering” as “starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process 
which aided in its development or manufacture”); see also Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Business 
Information, supra note 69, at para. 16 (“In the interest of innovation and to foster competition, the provisions 
of this Directive should not create any exclusive right to know-how or information protected as trade secrets. 
Thus, the independent discovery of the same know-how or information should remain possible. Reverse 
engineering of a lawfully acquired product should be considered as a lawful means of acquiring information, 
except when otherwise contractually agreed.”); Determann et al., supra note 68, at 181. 
 78. The qualification of trade secrets as property is controversial and determined differently for purposes 
of different areas of law. For example, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that if state law 
recognizes a trade secret as property, then for purposes of a federal “taking” analysis, it is property. MILGRAM 
ET AL., supra note 75, § 2.01. 
 79. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 25; see also id. at 37 (“Legal protection for trade secrets is premised 
primarily on two theories that are only partly complementary. The first is utilitarian. Under this view, protecting 
against the theft of proprietary information encourages investment in such information. . . . The second theory 
emphasizes deterrence of wrongful acts and is therefore sometimes described as a tort theory.”). 
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rights in data are particularly evident with respect to data generated by connected 
cars and other devices on the Internet of Things. Device manufacturers typically 
cannot access information from devices without the device owners’ consent,80 
much less keep the information secret from the device owners. Device 
manufacturers thus generally cannot claim trade secret ownership rights in the 
data and information generated by the devices they sell to customers. Consumers 
also typically cannot claim trade secret rights in the data produced by the devices 
they own because they cannot substantiate a competitive advantage from 
keeping the data secret. Moreover, much of the data and information generated 
by cars and other connected devices, such as its location and environment, is 
generated and displayed in plain sight, depriving that information of secrecy. 
Thus, trade secret laws do not convey meaningful ownership in data, and instead, 
merely offer some level of protection against unfair misappropriation of 
information. 
E. PATENT 
Patent law provides property rights to systems or methods that involve 
inventive use, storage, or application of data in certain instances. But patent law 
does not provide any ownership rights in the underlying data itself. 
Inventors can acquire patent rights to new, non-obvious and useful 
processes, machines, manufactures or compositions of matter, and to new and 
useful improvements thereof.81 Although the protection granted under patent 
law is generally broad, and as often cited, embraces “anything under the sun that 
is made by man,”82 the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes limitations to patent-
eligible subject matter, such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.83 These limitations were described as “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work,” for which a monopoly through patent rights would impede 
innovation.84 Although use, storage, or application of data can be patentable, the 
underlying data is not eligible for patent protection.85 Patent law is thus not an 
 
 80. The U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other jurisdictions’ computer interference laws expressly 
prohibit such access. Lothar Determann, Internet Freedom and Computer Abuse, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 429, 443 (2013). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (utility); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (novelty); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011) 
(nonobviousness). 
 82. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. 
NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 83. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 
(1981); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 67 (1972); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874). 
 84. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 145 (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67). 
 85. See Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“As noted by 
the Supreme Court, ‘an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure of process 
may well be deserving of patent protection.’ . . . [thus] [t]he method in the ‘415 patent claims an abstract idea 
because it describes a process of organizing information through mathematical correlations and is not tied to a 
specific structure or machine.” (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added)); see also W. Nicholson Price II, 
Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1420 (2016) (“Facts and data do not 
fall within one of the four categories of patentable subject matter . . . . This leaves only the algorithms that 
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effective legal framework for protecting the rights to data. 
F. TRADEMARK 
Trademark law, also, does not provide appropriate property rights to data. 
Brand names and logos used on goods and services are protected by trademark 
law against unauthorized use in commerce to the extent that such use could 
confuse consumers.86 The purpose of trademark law has “remained constant and 
limited: Identification of the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider 
of a service,”87 with a fair use defense that “forbids a trademark registrant to 
appropriate a descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others from 
accurately describing a characteristic of their goods.”88 
Informational content, such as a person’s last name used in a business, can 
therefore be trademarked, referring to the use in a particular branch. However, 
this does not grant ownership rights in the data or information itself and it only 
entitles the holder to prevent others from using the name in a confusing way (for 
example, within the same business branch for which the trademark was 




actually drive black-box medicine as potential subjects of patent protection.”). In Mayo Collaborative Servs v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), the Supreme Court illustrated the difference between data and 
patent-eligible subject matter. The patent in question claimed methods for calibrating the effective dosage for 
certain drugs to treat autoimmune disease by correlating drug metabolites and the treatment’s likely 
effectiveness. Id. at 73. The Court held that this data correlation, with little more—telling doctors to increase or 
decrease the drug based on the metabolite level—was not patentable. Id. at 72. The Court referred to the 
correlation data as a “law of nature” and noted that “a law of nature is not patentable.” Id. at 77. The Court 
explained that one must do something more with the data—apply it in a meaningful way—in order to render it 
patent eligible. Id. at 71. However, a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature of a 
mathematical algorithm. Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187). Indeed, an “‘application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.’” Id. (quoting 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187)). But, the Court cautioned that “to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-
eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words 
‘apply it.’” Id. at 72. The Court provided somewhat more of an explication of what additional application would 
be sufficient in a later case, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). There, 
the PTO granted a patent claiming the isolation of a particular DNA segment, and also the synthetically created 
DNA (complementary or cDNA). Id. at 582–83. The Court held that the DNA segment was nothing more than 
the product of nature and not patent eligible, but that the synthetic DNA was patent eligible because it “d[id] not 
present the same obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments.” Id. at 594. The 
scientists took the data and made something new. Id. at 595 (“[T]he lab technician unquestionably creates 
something new when [synthetic DNA] is made.”). 
 86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012); see also Gesetz über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen 
Kennzeichen [MarkenG] [Trade Mark Act], Oct. 25, 1994, BGBL I at 3082, last amended Oct. 19, 2013, BGBL 
I at 3830, art. 3, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_markeng/englisch_markeng.pdf 
(Ger.). 
 87. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 88. Id. at 306 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 
(5th Cir. 1980)). 
F - DETERMANN_25 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:55 AM 
18 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
G. COPYRIGHT 
Copyright law can provide property rights to original works of authorship 
that contain information, including creative compilations of data, but not to the 
underlying data itself. Although there are different philosophical foundations of 
copyright law, the predominant philosophical framework undergirding 
American copyright law is utilitarian:89 “The immediate effect of our copyright 
law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim 
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”90 
Authors of writings and other works are thus granted protection under 
copyright law if they are creative.91 “The subject matter protectable by copyright 
spans the broad range of literary and artistic expression—including literature, 
song, dance, sculpture, graphics, painting, photography, sound, movies, and 
computer programming.”92 But copyright law protects only the creative 
expression of information, and not the information itself.93 Copyright owners 
hold the exclusive right to exclude others from copying, adapting, distributing, 
performing, or displaying creative content,94 but not with respect to the 
underlying factual information contained within. For example, an accounting 
book author would be able to assert her rights under copyright law against literal 
copying of the book’s text, but not against differently-worded descriptions of the 
accounting methods contained within the book.95 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
pointed out, in “considering the general question of property in news matter, it 
is necessary to recognize its dual character, distinguishing between the substance 
of the information and the particular form or collocation of words in which the 
writer has communicated it.”96 
 
 89. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 435; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the 
power to enact copyright laws in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). 
 90. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 91. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); German Copyright Act, supra note 46, § 2; see also MERGES ET AL., 
supra note 43, at 436 (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded . . . .” (quoting Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))). 
 92. Id. at 434. 
 93. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”); see also MERGES ET AL., supra 
note 43, at 434 (“Ideas themselves are not copyrightable, but the author’s particular expression of an idea is 
protectable.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (holding that “all facts—
scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day” are part of the public domain and are not copyrightable). 
This also true under German copyright law, which requires a certain level of creativity (“Schoepfungshoehe”). 
See German Copyright Act, supra note 46, § 2(2). 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); German Copyright Act, supra note 46, at §§ 15–23. 
 95. See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (“[B]lank account-books are not the subject of 
copyright; and [] the mere copyright of Selden’s book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and 
use account-books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and described and illustrated in said book.”). 
 96. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918). Further, various limitations also apply 
to copyrightable subject matter in the interest of promoting constructive criticisms, comments, news reporting, 
teaching, scholarship and research. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (discussing the fair use doctrine); German 
Copyright Act, supra note 46, §§ 49; Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 14 (“This Directive should seek to promote learning and culture by protecting 
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In certain instances, copyright law grants copyright ownership rights to 
compilations of data, as long as that compilation is creative. An author can 
creatively select or arrange the facts in a compilation, for example, by choosing 
“which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the 
collected data.”97 The resulting compilation then entails a degree of creativity, 
and may therefore possess the requisite originality for copyright protection.98 
But even in such cases, no copyright is attached to the factual data itself.99 
Where cars and other connected devices generate and record data, the 
resulting compilations will often already lack human creativity, and thus an 
abstraction filtration test to separate facts and creative expression is not even 
necessary. Neither monkeys taking selfies, nor autonomous cars recording 
security footage, can create copyrightable works, or own copyrights.100 When 
companies write software code to cause connected cars or other devices to 
generate and compile data, human creativity can manifest itself separately and 
apart from the compiled data, like in the coding of self-learning programs that 
create maps using artificial intelligence in autonomous cars. It can then be 
difficult to separate the creative aspects of the resulting work or compilation 
from the non-protectable factual information.101 For example, a creator of a 
database containing information on traffic conditions, road hazards and speed 
cameras may attempt to claim copyright protection for the compilation.102 
Nonetheless, the database creator will typically be unable to show that the 




works and other subject-matter while permitting exceptions or limitations in the public interest for the purpose 
of education and teaching.”). 
 97. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 348. 
 98. Id. at 363 (declining the copyrightability of the arrangement of data in a telephone directory because 
there was “nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory” as this 
was “an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a 
matter of course”). This principle is embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), which defines “compilation” as “a 
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, 
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 100. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §§ 306, 313.2 (3d ed. 
2017). 
 101. Eric Goldman, Google Defeats Copyright Lawsuit over Waze Data, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2015, 1:40PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/12/16/google-defeats-copyright-lawsuit-over-waze-
data/#3bd2e916ff23 (noting that copyright case law regarding facts and compilations is often confusing and that 
questions regarding what is fact and non-fact “routinely baffle judges”). 
 102. See generally PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03986-JCS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
167754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015) (dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that the defendant infringed its 
copyright by copying “Points of Interest,” such as traffic conditions, dangerous road segments, road hazards, 
and traffic enforcement monitors, from the plaintiff’s database containing navigation information). 
 103. See id. at *19 (discussing PhantomALERT’s argument that its map reflects creativity). But see 
PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 15-cv-03986-JCS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30321 (N.D. Cal. 2016). at 
*26 (“The Court now finds that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that at least 
some of the Points of Interest in its database are characterized by sufficient originality to warrant copyright 
protection.”). 
F - DETERMANN_25 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:55 AM 
20 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
Further, any protection granted to compilations would, in practice, only 
safeguard against a very limited scope of actions. Copyright law, again, does not 
extend to the facts contained in the compilation and is limited to the facts’ 
particular selection or arrangement. This means that a subsequent compiler will 
be free to use the facts contained in the prior compilation, as long as the 
competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.104 To be 
successful with copyright claims, a plaintiff thus has to prove that the defendant 
copied more than the merely extracted factual information.105 If a developer 
reproduces and adapts copyrighted code for the sole purpose of extracting non-
copyrightable data from expression within a work of authorship, this is 
permissible under the fair use doctrine.106 
In summary, copyright law does not create ownership rights in the data 
contained within a compilation or database. To the contrary, copyright law 
expressly leaves out factual information from copyrightable material, and in the 
U.S., precludes the states from creating copyright-like property regimes for 
information or data.107 
H. U.S. STATE LAWS ON MISAPPROPRIATION AND EU DATABASE DIRECTIVE 
Companies that invest significant time and effort into the creation of 
databases can claim limited protection against free-riders under the European 
database laws108 and U.S. state laws on misappropriation.109 
 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 105. See PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03986-JCS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30321, at 
*24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (holding that facts are not original and not copyrightable). 
 106. Lothar Determann & David Nimmer, Software Copyright’s Oracle from the Cloud, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 161, 174–75 (2015). 
 107. Unlike the data generated by a device, the software used in connected cars and other devices is 
protected by copyright law. In the United States, source and object code of software is protected as “literary 
work” and thus enjoys the same protections and limitations as copies of other copyrightable works. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2012); see also Whelan Assocs.v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d. Cir. 1986). Europe 
grants protection to software copies in the directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16. For a detailed discussion 
of tailoring legal protection for computer software, see Determann & Nimmer, supra note 106, at 165–72, and 
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1354 (1987). For 
an overview of software copyright protection in the EU, see Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S. and EC 
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More Different than They Seem?, 13 J.L. & COM. 279 
(1994). 
 108. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal 
Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter EC Database Directive] (offering copyright-like 
protection to creators of valuable databases). 
 109. See U.S. Golf Ass’n v. Arroyo Software Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 714–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) 
(discussing California’s common law misappropriation as applicable to the unauthorized use of golf handicap 
formulas that were developed through intensive data collection and analysis); see also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. 
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852–54 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the merits of a “hot news” misappropriation 
claim in the context of unauthorized electronic delivery of near-real-time professional basketball statistics); Bd. 
of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526, 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (applying Illinois’s common law 
misappropriation to the unauthorized use of the Dow Jones Index and Averages as a trading vehicle); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, 
Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
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Unlike copyright law, which protects the creativity or authorship arising 
from a collection of facts, U.S. state laws on misappropriation and European 
database laws afford limited sui generis protection for collections of information 
that require significant investments.110 These protections are intended and 
framed as torts to safeguard business integrity and fair competition.111 For the 
same reasons, news organizations can claim limited protection for “hot news 
items” against immediate copying by free-riders only if the factual information 
is time-sensitive and requires significant efforts to discover.112 But such limited 
protections against freeriding by competitors are not framed as property law 
regimes and, like trade secret laws, constitute only narrow exceptions to the 
general rule that facts should be generally accessible and not subject to 
individual exclusivity rights. 
In the EU, the financial and professional investment in an arrangement of 
facts is safeguarded through a sui generis right to enable database makers113 to 
protect their respective time, money, and effort;114 they are entitled to prevent 
extraction or re-utilization of the whole or a substantial part (qualitatively or 
quantitatively) of the database.115 But, full copyright-like property protections 
in European database protection laws apply only to the creative selection or 
arrangement of the factual information, which carves out the individual 




151, 157 (1997) (“Misappropriation is a broad, common law anticopying doctrine. ‘The misappropriation 
doctrine potentially is available whenever a person imitates or duplicates a work developed at the expense of 
another.’” (quoting David E. Shipley, Refusing to Rock the Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine 
Applied to Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 385, 413 (1990))). 
 110. EC Database Directive, supra note 108, at art. 7; see also Determann et al., supra note 68, at 184. 
 111. EC Database Directive, supra note 109, at paras. 5–6, explains the legislative considerations and intent 
as follows:  
[C]opyright remains an appropriate form of exclusive right for authors who have created 
databases . . . nevertheless, in the absence of a harmonized system of unfair-competition legislation 
or of case-law, other measures are required in addition to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or 
reutilization of the contents of a database. 
 112. See generally Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (holding that a news article 
may be copyrighted under the Copyright Act, but that the news itself is not copyrightable). 
 113. See EC Database Directive, supra note 108, at art. 1(2) (defining the term “database” as “a collection 
of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually 
accessible by electronic or other means”). 
 114. Id. at paras. 39–40 (“[T]his Directive seeks to safeguard the position of makers of databases against 
misappropriation of the results of the financial and professional investment made in obtaining and collection the 
contents by protecting the whole or substantial parts of a database against certain acts by a user or competitor; . . . 
[T]he object of this sui generis right is to ensure protection of any investment in obtaining, verifying or 
presenting the contents of a database for the limited duration of the right; whereas such investment may consist 
in the deployment of financial resources and/or the expending of time, effort and energy . . . .”). 
 115. Id. at art 7(1); see also German Copyright Act, supra note 46, § 97 (stating a right to require cessation 
of infringement and a right to damages).  
 116. See Malte Grützmacher, Dateneigentum—ein Flickenteppich: Wem gehören die Daten bei Industrie 
4.0, Internet der Dinge und Connected Cars?, COMPUTER UND RECHT, Aug. 2016, at 485, 488 (Ger.) (discussing 
German laws that could support ownership rights in data). 
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If a device manufacturer, software company or online service provider 
deliberately configures a connected device to collect and report the data for 
purposes of creating a database—and obtains the required consents and 
authorizations from the device buyers to legally create such a database—then 
the company may acquire limited ownership rights in that database under U.S. 
state laws on commercial misappropriation and EU database protection laws.117 
Also, companies can develop, purchase, deploy and configure connected devices 
specifically to create a database that is valuable to their business and then claim 
database protection rights, for example, a weather forecast company that deploys 
drones and sensors to collect up-to-date weather information or a traffic advisory 
service provider that guides drivers to find the quickest routes. 
But in the absence of deliberate database creation plans and investments, 
neither the EU database directive nor the U.S. state laws on misappropriation 
offers significant property rights with respect to data generated by connected 
cars or other devices as mere byproducts.118 Even when limited exclusivity rights 
do attach, available remedies have limited scopes: protection is only applicable 
against wholesale copying of the database or substantial parts of it, typically 
where freeriding could have a noticeable impact on investments and 
competition. Individual information content elements, however, are excluded 
from protection under database protection laws in the interest of protecting 
public interests in information. 
I. DATA PRIVACY 
Data privacy laws are intended to protect individual freedom and human 
dignity.119 They favor data minimization and are not intended to incentivize  
 
 
 117. See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 962, 988–90 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (a key issue was whether 
plaintiffs gave their consent to allow the application to access their contact information, but if they had given 
such consent, then the defendant’s motion to dismiss likely would have been granted because there would be no 
misappropriation); Salestraq Am., LLC v. Zyskowski, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184–85 (D. Nev. 2009) 
(defendants did not violate CFAA because they had a license to access plaintiff’s website and did not exceed the 
scope of the license); Case C-203/02, The British Horseracing Bd., Ltd. & Others v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 
2004 E.C.R. I-10415; Case C-444/02, Fixtures Mktg., Ltd. v. Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou 
AE (OPAP), 2004 E.C.R. I-10549; BGH, GRUR 2010, 1004 (1005) (German appellate court’s decision on 
ownership rights to traffic data collected by toll technologies). But see Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. 
Supp. 2d 1115, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (permitting a claim of misappropriation to proceed despite the fact that 
the plaintiff had consented to the defendant accessing his program). 
 118. See Gruetzmacher, supra note 116, at 487–488; Thomas J. Farkas, Data Created by the Internet of 
Things: The New Gold Without Ownership, 23 REV. LA PROPIEDAD INMATERIAL 5, 9 (2017) (“[I]n case of the 
networked car, the data generated by virtue of the sensors must rather be regarded as raw data. E.g., the data 
regarding location and driving behaviour [sic] is rather not in a systematic or methodical order.”); see also JOSEF 
DREXL ET AL., POSITION STATEMENT OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION OF 
16 AUGUST 2016 ON THE CURRENT EUROPEAN DEBATE: DATA OWNERSHIP AND ACCESS TO DATA 1, 10 (2016). 
For a discussion on how information generated from the collected data might be granted protection, see Lothar 
Determann, Social Media Privacy: A Dozen Myths and Facts, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, 3 (2012). 
 119. See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 20, at para. 1 (“The protection of natural 
persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right. [Privacy laws] provide that everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”). 
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creation or production. Privacy laws are thus generally not referred to as property 
laws.120 
Privacy laws give data subjects the right to exclude others from acquiring 
or using certain personal information about them, similar to the exclusion rights 
conferred by property laws.121 EU lawmakers have taken broad action to protect 
data privacy and have restated in the new General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) that companies are generally prohibited from processing any personal 
data unless there is a statutory exception.122 Such strongly worded exclusion 
rights have been likened to property law concepts.123 Yet, GDPR stops short of 
recognizing ownership or property rights for data subjects and refers to 
“ownership” and “property” only to recognize the conflicting rights that may 
outweigh privacy interests.124 Even the novel right to data portability is quite 
limited: it applies only to personal data provided (not created or acquired by an 
“owner”), by the data subject (not any “owner”), based on consent or contract 
(not legitimate interests, law or other bases), and does not confer any exclusion, 
usage or alienation rights.125 
In the United States, overlapping federal and state regulations on data 
privacy126 protect reasonable privacy expectations under tort laws and sector-
specific regulations with even less of a property law-like character as provided 
in GDPR.127 
For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), which is the federal statute governing healthcare data, protects the 
privacy of individually identifiable information, but does not grant any 
ownership rights to the individuals in their records.128 For a few state statutes  
 
 
 120. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 2058. 
 121. See Samuelson, supra note 15, at 1130 (“Because the law will sometimes protect [personal data in the 
hands of others] and other types of data from unauthorized uses and disclosures, this too may reinforce a sense 
of ownership in personal data.” (footnote omitted)). 
 122. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 4(1) (defining “personal data” as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”); id. at art. 4(2) (defining “processing” as 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or 
not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”). 
 123. Jacob M. Victor, Comment, The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward a Property Regime 
for Protecting Data Privacy, 123 YALE L.J. 513, 515 (2013) (“[T]he Regulation takes the unprecedented step 
of, in effect, creating a property regime in personal data . . . .”). 
 124. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 20, at para. 63 (“Where possible, the controller 
should be able to provide remote access . . . [but] [t]hat right should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms 
of others . . . .”).  
 125. Id. at art. 20. 
 126. See Erika G. Martin & Grace M. Begany, Opening Government Health Data to the Public: Benefits, 
Challenges, and Lessons Learned from Early Innovators, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 345, 348 (2017). 
 127. LOTHAR DETERMANN, DETERMANN’S FIELD GUIDE TO DATA PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE xvii (3d ed. 2017). 
 128. Who Owns Health Information?, HEALTHINFOLAW (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.healthinfolaw.org/lb/download-document/6640/field_article_file. 
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pertaining to automotive event data recorders (EDRs), which serve as “black 
boxes” for recording critical sensor and diagnostic data prior to collisions, 
legislatures have used a property law terminology and allocated “ownership” to 
data from EDRs to drivers or vehicle owners.129 But the statutes make clear that 
their intent is to allocate ownership to the physical embodiment of data on the 
tangible EDR devices, and not to create property rights to the information 
content itself, which eye witnesses, security cameras, other traffic participants 
and forensic investigators are free to acquire from other sources. Similarly, 
California privacy laws impose security breach notification obligations on 
“owners” of certain computerized data,130 but clarify in their definitional section 
that the “ownership” term is broadly deployed to protect any data held by a 
company for its own business purposes131 (as opposed to data handled by a 
service provider, which are subject to different notification rules).132 Thus, even 
though the California legislature uses the term “owner” in connection with 
“data,” it neither relies on existing property law concepts nor recognizes 
property rights to data. 
In the California Consumer Privacy Act, which was enacted in June 2018 
and becomes effective in January 2020, California imposes significant 
restrictions on sales of personal information: Consumers receive far-reaching 
rights to demand data access, erasure and portability, and prohibition of sales of 
their data.133 Businesses must not charge or penalize consumers for exercising 
their rights. Consequently, companies find the value of personal information and 
their options with respect to the use, sharing and monetization of data greatly 
reduced. Thus, California protects individual privacy from alleged risks 
associated with data sharing and commercialization with a legal regime that 




 129. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-107(c), (e) (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.928 (2017); see also 
Frederick J. Pomerantz & Aaron J. Aisen, Auto Insurance Telematics Data Privacy and Ownership, 1 MEALEY’S 
DATA PRIVACY L. REP. 1, 5 (2005) (“[T]he Arkansas, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Oregon 
statutes all refer to EDR data as property with the same ownership rights as tangible property.”). 
 130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018). 
 131. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(a)(1)–(2) (West 2018) (“It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure 
that personal information about California residents is protected. To that end, the purpose of this section is to 
encourage businesses that own, license, or maintain personal information about Californians to provide 
reasonable security for that information. For the purpose of this section, the terms ‘own’ and ‘license’ include 
personal information that a business retains as part of the business’ internal customer account or for the purpose 
of using that information in transactions with the person to whom the information relates. The term ‘maintain’ 
includes personal information that a business maintains but does not own or license.”). 
 132. LOTHAR DETERMANN, CALIFORNIA PRIVACY LAW—PRACTICAL GUIDE AND COMMENTARY, Ch. 2–15, 
1.3(g) (3d ed. 2018). 
 133. Lothar Determann, Analysis: The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY 
PROF. (July 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/. 
 134. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.192 (West 2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020) (the rights are inalienable because 
this section voids any contract or agreement that purports to waive or limit in any way a consumer’s rights under 
the title). 
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and portability rights in personal information, the California Consumer Privacy 
Act significantly limits the level of control that businesses can acquire or retain 
over personal information. As a result, the law also reduces the potential profit 
for consumers from selling personal information because it renders consumers 
legally incapable of effectively waiving rights to data access, erasure, porting or 
right to prohibit data sharing. Thus, the California Consumer Privacy Act goes 
into the opposite direction of creating property rights to data and further 
diminishes any potential for commercial interests in personal information. 
Legal scholars, on the other hand, have proposed information property law 
regimes to protect privacy.135 Data protection authorities in the EU also 
encourage the thought that individual persons own the personal data relating to 
them,136 and popular rhetoric regarding privacy protections gives people 
elsewhere the idea that they “own” their personal data.137 Yet, except for 
exclusion rights, data protection and privacy laws diverge from property laws. 
Privacy laws do not incentivize or reward creation or investment, do not regulate 
the acquisition or transfer of ownership rights to others, and do not apply against 
everyone. Instead, EU data protection laws confer exclusion rights against 
governments and businesses, but not against individuals acting for personal or 
household purposes.138 Further, most U.S. data privacy laws tend to be sector-
specific and apply to certain types of businesses, organizations or individuals,139 
unlike property laws, which tend to apply to everyone.140 
J. SUMMARY 
Real and personal property laws may protect physical embodiments of 
information—including data on storage disks within computers, stationary 
server farms, or event data recorders (popularly known as “black boxes”) in cars,  
 
 
 135. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOC. RES.: AN INT’L Q. 247 (2002); see also 
Schwartz, supra note 15, at 2056–60. 
 136. See, e.g., ICO Warns Data Broking Industry After Issuing £80,000 Fine to Unlawful Data Supplier, 
INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2017/11/ico-warns-data-broking-industry-after-issuing-80-000-fine-to-unlawful-data-supplier/ (quoting 
an ICO representative as saying: “Businesses need to understand they don’t own personal data—people do”). 
 137. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 15, at 1130 (discussing and refuting the possible reasons why individuals 
might naturally assume they own data about themselves); see also Datenschutz ist kein Selbstzweck, DER 
TAGESSPIEGEL (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:31 PM), http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/data-debates-datenschutz-ist-kein-
selbstzweck/19391956.html (stating that the people’s assumption of data ownership is mistaken). 
 138. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 2(2)(c). 
 139. See DETERMANN, supra note 132, at 1.3(g); see also Lothar Determann, New California Law Against 
Data Sharing, 35 COMPUTER INTERNET LAW., Sept. 2018, at 1, 4–8; Lothar Determann & Chetan Gupta, 
INSIGHT: Impact of the California Consumer Privacy Act on Employers, BLOOMBERG L. (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/insight-impact-california-n73014481141/; Lothar Determann, INSIGHT: Be Wary of 
Liability for Statutory Damages Under California Consumer Privacy Act (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/insight-wary-liability-n73014477131/. 
 140. See Herbert Zech, Daten als Wirtschaftsgut—Überlegungen zu einem Recht des Datenerzeugers: Gibt 
es für Anwenderdaten ein eigenes Vermögensrecht bzw, ein übertragbares Ausschließlichkeitsrecht?, 31 
COMPUTER UND RECHT 137, 139 (2015) (Ger.) (arguing in favor of property rights to data). 
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or as warning signs on walls or roads—but such protection does not extend to 
the informational content. Intellectual property laws (notably in copyright and 
patent laws) tend to carve out factual content from protected subject matter to 
preserve public access to such factual information. Creative information 
collection schemes and valuable databases that are subject to significant 
investments enjoy some limited protection against copying and freeriding, but 
individual information elements are still not protected. Trade secret law can 
protect factual information, but only if the information is kept secret and 
provides economic value from being a secret. U.S. data privacy and EU data 
protection laws do not greatly resemble property law regimes, but afford 
important exclusion rights to data subjects, which are further examined in Parts 
III, IV, and V. Thus, the answer to the question “who owns the data generated 
from connected cars and other Internet of Things devices?” is “no one, really.” 
III.  DATA ACCESS RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW 
No one owns property rights in data, as shown in Part II, but the complex 
landscape of data access rights and restrictions, summarized in this Part, created 
by legislatures and courts for various purposes and interests, serves as a basis 
for a discussion in Part IV and V of this Article, which addresses whether 
additional property rights in data are needed, helpful or harmful. 
A. RIGHTS TO DATA ACCESS, ERASURE, PORTABILITY AND USE 
RESTRICTIONS 
Data subjects (drivers, patients, cellphone owners) do not generally own 
data about them,141 but are entitled to certain restrictions regarding the use of 
their data by companies and governments under data privacy laws.142 And they 
are further entitled to access, erasure, and portability of their personal data 
processed by companies under data protection laws in the EU and other 
jurisdictions.143 
B. COMPUTER INTERFERENCE LAWS 
Owners of data-generating devices (cars, heart monitors, phones and other 
connected devices) are protected from access to data and information stored on 
their devices under computer interference laws such as the U.S. Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (CFAA), which prohibits people from accessing a computer to  
 
 
 141. As mentioned, restrictions from data privacy do not just lead to property rights. See supra Part III.A; 
Determann, supra note 118, at 3 (“Talk about informational self-determination and proposals for property law 
regimes to protect privacy sometimes gives people the idea that they own personal data about themselves. Fact 
is that no one owns facts.”). 
 142. For a comprehensive review of this issue, see generally DETERMANN, supra note 127. 
 143. See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 15 (right of access); id. at art. 17 
(right to erasure); id. at art. 20 (right to data portability). 
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obtain information without or beyond the scope of authorization.144 Computer 
and software manufacturers thus have to obtain authorization from end-users 
before any error report is sent back or any device is accessed for repair and 
maintenance purposes. The same applies to manufacturers of connected cars—
manufacturers are prohibited from designing cars that automatically send data 
back to them without authorization from the car owner. Although the car owners 
will likely provide such authorization in consideration for various services, such 
as for navigation, traffic updates, accident reports, entertainment, and telematics 
services, those authorizations will be provided only when something of value is 
offered by the service providers. 
C.  RIGHT TO REPAIR STATUTES AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND COMPETITION 
LAWS 
Car manufacturers need to design cars with prescribed degrees of openness 
under the “right to repair” statutes, environmental laws requiring independent 
emission tests, and general competition laws.145 Any device, software, or online 
service provider that designs technical restrictions on its own products to favor 
its own spare parts, add-on products, or services can be subject to serious 
sanctions under antitrust laws, as recently demonstrated by a €2.4 billion fine 
against an online search provider for offering an internet search service that 
allegedly favors its own content.146 Given that device manufacturers naturally 
have market power for spares and add-on services,147 their level of discretion on 
 
 144. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) (2012). But see id. § 1030(e)(2) (2012) (defining “protected computer” as 
practically including any ordinary computer and cellphone connected to the internet, as the internet is regarded 
as an instrumentality of interstate commerce as required by the definition).  
 145. To protect consumers, lawmakers have proposed or passed various statutes on the “right to repair” 
doctrine, requiring automakers to provide the same information to independent repair shops as they do to their 
authorized dealer network. See generally THE REPAIR ASS’N, http://repair.org/association (last visited Nov. 21, 
2018). The lawmakers are therefore directly focusing on protecting a basic level of openness in cars. See On-
Board Diagnostic II (OBD II) Systems—Fact Sheet/FAQs, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/obdprog/obdfaq.htm (last updated Oct. 28, 2015) (showing that California Air 
Resource Board developed On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) requirements to monitor nearly every component that 
could affect the emissions performance of a vehicle). Thus, requirements originating from California 
environmental legislation already establish an important degree of openness. The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), along with state agencies such as the California Air Resources Board, continue to regulate 
emission-related parts. See EPA Emission Standards Reference Guide for On-road and Nonroad Vehicles and 
Engines, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/emission-standards-reference-guide (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018). Under antitrust and competition laws, as well as self-regulatory undertakings, car 
manufacturers cannot monopolize aftermarkets for parts and add-on products. 
 146. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion 
for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service 
(June 27, 2017). 
 147. So long as several strong car manufacturers remain present on international markets, competition 
remains sufficiently strong. Monopolization challenges will therefore focus on aftermarket products for a 
particular brand, arguing that automotive manufacturers have monopoly power in the aftermarket for their own 
cars and willfully maintain such power through anticompetitive means. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. 
Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966)). Some 
courts have included an explicit third factor that the plaintiff suffer an antitrust injury as a result. In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1087 (D. Kan. 2000). 
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adding restraints on interfaces, ports and other data access means with regard to 
device owners and spare part providers is limited by these statutes and laws. 
D.  LAWS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, PRODUCT SAFETY, IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Consumers are protected against threats posed by connected cars and other 
devices under product safety, product liability, and contract laws,148 which 
require manufacturers, distributors, and add-on service providers to ensure that 
any of the connected devices and services that they sell are designed to function 
in a safe and functional manner.149 Safety considerations warrant interfaces and 
access means that are sufficiently “open” to allow device owners to update, 
upgrade, and secure products over time.150 Depending on how consumer 
expectations and laws develop around the openness of cars, in the future, a 
connected car with insufficient interoperability or upgradability may become 
legally declared as defective under the product safety, product liability, and 
warranty laws, and run afoul of environmental sustainability requirements, 
because of its unnecessarily short life cycle.151 
IV.  INTERESTS IN DATA AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW 
Persons, businesses, and governments have different interests in data. This 
Part examines such interests in the context of an entire ecosystem of persons and 
entities involved with the Internet of Things—instead of selectively citing to 
anecdotal scenarios and unconnected interests. The interests of parties 
concerned are identified and associated with existing legal protections available 
under current law (summarized in Part III) to lay the ground work for identifying 
any potential gaps that could warrant ownership rights in data, which do not yet 
exist (as discussed in Part II) but are contemplated (as discussed in Part V). For 
illustration purposes, this Part specifically refers to data generated by cars as an 





 148. 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (2012); 49 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 501 (2016); National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, Request for Public Comments NHTSA Enforcement 
Guidance Bulletin 2016–02: Safety-Related Defects and Emerging Automotive Technologies, 81 Fed. Reg. 
18,935 (Apr. 1, 2016); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY §1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 149. The most recent restatement on product liability states that “a product is defective in design when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 150. Cf. Determann & Perens, supra note 6, at 934–936 (discussing the perils of lawmakers tendency to 
discourage openness and independence). 
 151. See id. at 924 (discussing the lifecycle autonomous vehicles, their need for software updating, and that 
the openness in updating “places an end-date on the occurrence of events that would lead to liability of the 
manufacturer for a particular software and hardware version”). 
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a data ownership regime by the German government. 
A.  CAR OWNERS 
Most car buyers will be interested in data accessibility, safety features and, 
interoperability to ensure competitive pricing and availability of data-driven 
services (navigation, autonomous driving, and entertainment), spare parts, 
updates, upgrades, and maintenance services.152 Car owners will need open ports 
in their cars to install brand-agnostics telematics and fleet management 
technologies, trackers required by insurance companies for individual tariffs, 
software, and devices to participate in ride-sharing models, and other add-ons, 
updates, and upgrades.153 Buyers will pursue their interests primarily by 
expressing preferences in the marketplace by buying cars that best meet their 
needs on data accessibility and interoperability. If manufacturers are overly 
restrictive or not upfront about the technological restraints on data access or 
interoperability, they may be penalized through complaints that get filed to 
consumer and competition supervisory bodies. 
With respect to data privacy, consumers and business owners will be in 
slightly different situations. For example, when a consumer owns a car, much of 
the data generated by the car will qualify as “personal data” because of its 
relationship with the individual owner. Consequently, the consumer will be able 
to rely on data privacy, consumer protection, and computer interference laws to 
object to unwanted data access and usage by the manufacturer, distributor, add-
on service providers, and others. Business owners on the other hand can take 
“data privacy by design” measures to sever the relationship between the vehicles 
and their individual drivers by keeping the individual names out of the telematics 
systems, but the drivers will be able to rely on computer interference laws to 
object to unwanted data access by manufacturers and others.154 Owners of large 
vehicle fleets (car rental companies, transportation businesses, ride sharing 
ventures, logistics providers, and other enterprises) have more pressing needs 
for brand-agonistic and interoperable data access to optimize fleet management,  
 
 
 152. See generally Simon Ninan et al., Who Owns the Road? The IoT-Connected Car of Today—and 
Tomorrow, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Aug. 18 2015), https://www.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/focus/internet-of-
things/iot-in-automotive-industry.html (“[D]rivers of the next generation want their cars to act as smartphones 
on wheels, like to remain connected and productive on the go, consider fully connected vehicles among the most 
beneficial futuristic technologies, and are ready to pay a sizeable amount for a vehicle that meets all their 
technology wants and needs.”); see also Determann & Perens, supra note 150, at 934–936 (stating that the car 
might otherwise become unsafe or unusable and be subject to obsolescence). 
 153. See Masa Hasegawa, Connected Vehicles Enter the Mainstream—Trends and Strategic Implications, 
DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/connected-vehicles-enter-the-
mainstream.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (stating that vehicle consumers will likely expect their vehicle 
systems to maintain compatibility with newly purchased consumer electronics for five to six years, the average 
length of new vehicle ownership in the United States). Thus, given the length of time that vehicle consumers 
expect to own their cars, they will need to allow openness for routine technological updates. 
 154. See supra Subpart III.C. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) (2012)). 
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operation, and maintenance.155 Such owners will want various information, such 
as the location of each car, any need for maintenance, differences in fuel 
consumptions between different vehicle models, whether maximum working 
hour limits are being followed by the drivers, and ways in which their return on 
investment can be maximized from the vehicles. 
B.  DRIVERS AND PASSENGERS 
Drivers and passengers will generally be most interested in privacy and 
safety. Under current law, they are entitled to the provision of notice and choices 
regarding location-tracking and monitoring by the car owner, manufacturer, or 
others.156 Employee drivers can be advised of the employer’s data processing 
activities in accordance with the relevant laws.157 Car rental customers and 
taxicab passengers can be reached by pop-up notices in the car to enable their 
decision-making on whether to permit a certain functionality—like security 
cameras in the car, entertainment solutions, navigation systems, or location 
tracking—or to refrain from using a particular vehicle if not configurable. 
C.  OTHER TRAFFIC PARTICIPANTS 
Connected cars will communicate with other traffic participants, including 
other cars and their drivers, as well as cyclists, pedestrians, and bystanders, for 
safety reasons.158 Opportunities for providing proper notice and giving choices 
on data access will be limited, however, and standardization through legislation 
may thus be required. In the meantime, car manufacturers and owners will need 
to ensure that connected cars are constructed with “data privacy by design” 
principles in mind, so that there will be no illegal data collection or usage.159 
 
 155. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR 
INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 1, (2011), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/ 
Business%20Functions/McKinsey%20Digital/Our%20Insights/Big%20data%20The%20next%20frontier%20f
or%20innovation/MGI_big_data_exec_summary.ashx/. 
 156. See supra Subparts III.A, IV.A. 
 157. See Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are 
Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1004–05 (2011) 
(“Employers can—and often do—destroy any actual expectation of privacy by notifying employees in 
painstaking detail about the existence and intrusiveness of monitoring and surveillance technologies deployed.”). 
But employers have successfully defended against privacy claims when the tracked vehicles were company-
owned, particularly in cases where the tracking was to determine employee misconduct. See Karla 
Grossenbacher, Employee GPS Tracking—Is It Legal?, LEXOLOGY: GLOBAL PRIVACY WATCH BLOG (Jan. 26, 
2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a94fd053-3106-4836-bc9c-a25d05340ed5. 
 158. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Strategy 
on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, a Milestone Towards Cooperative, Connected and Automated 
Mobility, COM (2016) 766 final (Nov. 30, 2016). 
 159. Pushing for “privacy by design” requirements, the U.S. FTC has brought a number of cases against 
product manufacturers that did not sufficiently consider data security in the design of their products, which have 
included network cameras, home routers, and software platforms. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketer 
of Internet-Connected Home Security Video Cameras Settles FTC Charges It Failed to Protect Consumers’ 
Privacy (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-connected-
home-security-video-cameras-settles; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ASUS Settles FTC Charges that 
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D.  MANUFACTURERS 
Manufacturers can use data generated from connected cars to monitor 
maintenance status, anticipate and prevent failures, improve products, develop 
new products, and/or offer add-on services, updates, and upgrades.160 These 
manufacturers’ interests will be largely aligned with the interests of car owners 
so long as the manufacturers do not use the data against the interests of the car 
owners (for example by selling information on speeding violations to law 
enforcement agencies).161 Car owners will then remain informed about the 
manufacturers’ use of the car owners’ data and data access ports will remain 
open enough to allow the car owners to choose alternatives to the manufacturers’ 
offered updates, upgrades, and add-on services.162 
Manufacturers will not be legally entitled to receive any data from their 
sold cars, but they may design the cars in ways that automatically report the 
collected data back to their makers, as long as they obtain authorization from car 
owners (as required under computer interference laws)163 and provide sufficient 
notice and choices to car owners, drivers, passengers, and others regarding any 
personal data collected by the car manufacturers.164 
Manufacturers will also have interests in restraining access to technical 
data, primarily for three reasons: to (1) guard trade secrets on their 




Insecure Home Routers and “Cloud” Services Put Consumers’ Privacy At Risk (Feb. 23, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/02/asus-settles-ftc-charges-insecure-home-routers-cloud-
services-put/; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Oracle Agrees to Settle FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers 
About Java Software Updates (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/oracle-
agrees-settle-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-about-java. Under the General Data Protection Regulation, 
companies will be expressly required to consider data protection by design and by default and implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 
25. For a discussion on technical principles and implementation of IT security regarding the mentioned 
communications, see Thomas Strubbe et al., IT–Sicherheit in Kooperativen Intelligenten Verkehrssystemen, 41 
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 223, 223 (2017) (Ger.). 
 160. See Thilo Weichert, Datenschutz im Auto—Teil 1: Das Kfz als großes Smartphone mit Rädern, SVR, 
June 2016, at 201, 202 (Ger.) (analogizing cars to large smartphones on wheels); see also Welch, supra note 12 
(noting the convenience of the connected car and its abilty to self-run vehicle diagnostics).  
 161. This example may seem farfetched at first glance, but some concerns have surfaced regarding sharing 
navigation system information with government agencies. Archibald Preuschat, TomTom Drives into Speed 
Camera Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2011, 6:33 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2011/04/28/tomtom-
drives-into-speed-camera-scandal/.  
 162. Determann & Perens, supra note 150, at 947; Carol Sledge & Douglas C. Schmidt, A Discussion on 
Open-Systems Architecture, CARNEGIE MELLON U. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST.: SEI BLOG (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2015/11/a-discussion-on-open-systems-architecture.html; cf. Masa 
Hasegawa, Acceleration of the Connected Experience—Vehicle Connectivity and Evolving Customer 
Expectations, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/acceleration-of-the-
connected-experience-automotive-manufacturing.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (noting that customer 
expectations have evolved as a result of the technical evolution and that they expect more). 
 163. See supra Subpart III.C. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) (2012)). 
 164. See supra Subparts III.A, IV.A. 
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potential product liability and reputational harm resulting from aftermarket parts 
and manipulations, including cybersecurity weaknesses; and (3) reduce 
competition for spare parts, add-ons, updates, and upgrades in favor of the 
manufacturer’s own offerings. These interests of car manufacturers to restrain 
data access can come into conflict with competition laws and data access 
interests of car owners, who may reverse-engineer their products under trade 
secret law and are generally free to modify and upgrade their products, so long 
as they comply with the applicable laws.165 Due to market forces and reverse-
engineering possibilities, manufacturers will be incentivized to offer reasonable 
compromises on data access to buyers. Manufacturers can decide to offer more 
open (as opposed to closed or locked-in) products at different price-points, 
similarly to how DVD player manufacturers market region-free players166 or 
how mobile phone makers and service providers market unlocked phones and 
month-to-month contracts. 
E.  ADD-ON SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Add-on or “aftermarket” providers of services, parts, and features will have 
similar needs and interests as the manufacturers in collecting and processing 
relevant data.167 And similar to manufacturers, add-on service providers are not 
entitled to access any data, except with the authorization from the car owners 
and when in compliance with applicable data privacy laws.168 Companies that 
offer products or services competing with the manufacturer may be entitled to 
fair and non-discriminatory access to data from the cars under antitrust laws.169 
If a car owner chooses a service, the provider will typically need some data to 
perform the service (for example location data for GPS), in which case the 
request for an authorization needs to be spelled out in the applicable contract.170 
In turn, the data generated by the services will also attract the interests of various 
entities, such as government institutions.171 
 
 
 165. See supra Subparts III.D, IV.C. 
 166. See, e.g., Robert Silva, DVD Region Codes—What You Need to Know, LIFEWIRE (June 3, 2018), 
https://www.lifewire.com/dvd-region-codes-1845720 (discussing the Code-Free DVD). 
 167. See supra Subpart V.D. 
 168. See supra Subparts III.A, IV.A, IV.B. 
 169. See supra Subpart IV.C. 
 170. For discussions on the requirements arising from data privacy laws and computer interference laws, 
see supra Subparts III.A, IV.A, and IV.B. 
 171. See Cheryl Miller, Uber and Lyft Resist Regulators’ Appeal for Data Sharing, RECORDER (Oct. 10, 
2017, 7:03 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202800099561/?slreturn=20180804191454 (stating 
that Uber and Lyft are required by law to submit confidential annual reports to governmental institutions about 
“the types of service they provide, what neighborhoods they serve and how many miles their drivers log” and 
that “cities and local transportation planning agencies are eager to get access to that data to study traffic patterns 
and the fast-growing industry’s effect on roads and the environment,” but that the companies refuse to share this 
data with public agencies due to the privacy of both riders and drivers). 
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F.  CAR DEALERS AND DISTRIBUTORS 
Car dealers and distributors of spare parts, add-on products, updates, and 
upgrades will be interested in information relating to customer-relationship 
management, so that they can market additional products and services to car 
owners. Car dealers and distributors are usually permitted to use transaction 
information to market similar products and services, and they can obtain the 
customers’ consent to direct marketing in connection with the initial sale. For 
any access to data generated by cars, distributors will need to obtain 
authorizations from the car owners and possibly provide notice and choices to 
other data subjects involved, similar to the car manufacturers and add-on service 
providers,172 as discussed above. 
G.  INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Insurance companies will be interested in information on driving patterns 
so that they can assess and reduce risks, for example, through individual tariffs, 
which reward good driving and punish bad driving.173 They will need voluntary 
consent from the car owners for any data access and must comply with the data 
privacy laws that protect the privacies of drivers, passengers, and others, if and 
to the extent data is gathered indirectly from them.174 Where insurance 
companies offer individual tariffs as a discount, consumers and regulators can 
raise the question on whether consent is truly voluntary, given that a 
policyholder’s discount is another policyholder’s penalty.175 A significant 
penalty for failure to agree to tracking of driving patterns could be deemed as 
being coercive, depending on the circumstances.176 
H.  LAW ENFORCEMENT AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
Law enforcement agencies and civil litigants will be interested in data 
generated by cars, in connection with accidents and traffic law violations.177 
Under the applicable laws, they will typically need a court order or a voluntary 
consent from the car owner to access the data stored on a particular car. But they 
may be permitted to observe cars that are on public roads without limitations, as 
long as they do not interfere with the physical possession and property rights of 
 
 172. See supra Subparts V.D, V.E. 
 173. AALA SANTHOSH REDDY, COGNIZANT, THE NEW AUTO INSURANCE ECOSYSTEM: TELEMATICS, 
MOBILITY AND THE CONNECTED CAR 2 (2012), https://www.cognizant.com/InsightsWhitepapers/The-New-
Auto-Insurance-Ecosystem-Telematics-Mobility-and-the-Connected-Car.pdf; see also Welch, supra note 12; 
Hornung & Goeble, supra note 17, at 268. 
 174. See supra Subparts III.A, IV.A. 
 175. Patrick R. Mueller, Every Time You Brake, Every Turn You Make—I’ll Be Watching You: Protecting 
Driver Privacy in Event Data Recorder Information, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 135, 158–159 (2006). 
 176. Cf. id. at 159 & n.154 (noting that a driver’s agreement to monitoring is permissible as long as it is 
voluntary, in other words as long as it is not coerced). 
 177. Vince Bond Jr., Lawyers Reaching for In-Car Data, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, (Sept. 14, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20140914/OEM11/309159952/lawyers-reaching-for-in-car-data. 
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the car owner.178 If manufacturers, service providers, insurance companies, and 
others have custody of data, law enforcement agencies and civil litigants can try 
to compel those entities to release the requisite data.179 This in turn creates a 
need for those parties to carefully plan and protect their positions.180 
V.  SHOULD NEW PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DATA BE CREATED? 
Politicians in Germany have recently started a debate about the possibility 
of allocating property rights in data through new legislation.181 Similar demands 
have been made in the United States and elsewhere in the past.182 This brings us 
to the question of whether new property rights should be created for data. One 
methodology to answer would be to weigh “the reasons why information should 
be controlled by an owner (locked up)” against “the reasons why information 
should be not under an owner’s control (open for use by others).”183 
Specifically, this Part analyzes data propertization’s effects on the 
protection of creativity and technological advances and of personal privacy, 
which are often posited as rationales for “locking” information, and the 
enablement of freedom of expression and of competition, which are often 
advanced as bases for keeping “open” the information.184 
A.  CREATIVITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
As explained in Subpart II.A, the most widely adopted justification for 
granting property rights is utilitarian and economic, particularly to incentivize 
creations and improvements of things that advance technology or science. In a 
study published in August 2017, the German Federal Ministry of Transportation  
 
 
 178. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that the government’s installation 
of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements is a physical 
intrusion upon the car, constituting a “search” under the Fourth Amendment). 
 179. See supra Subpart IV.H (discussing the interests of governmental institutions, cities and local 
transportation planning agencies against ride-hailing companies). 
 180. See Lothar Determann, Views on Global Surveillance Laws from Lothar Determann of Baker & 
McKenzie, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 23, 2016), https://www.bna.com/views-global-surveillance-
n57982072794/. 
 181. See, e.g., Video-Podcast der Bundeskanzlerin #10/2017, PREISTRÄGER BEIM GRÜNDERWETTBEWERB 
IKT INNOVATIV 2015 (Mar. 18, 2017) (transcribed and available for download at https://www.bundeskanzlerin. 
de/Content/DE/Podcast/2017/2017-03-18-Video-Podcast/links/download-PDF.pdf;jsessionid 
=E48EE1966F5251A9B5832229E0D5ED0B.s6t1?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) 
(Ger.) (featuring Chancellor Angela Merkel); Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, supra 
note 17, at Part 4.4 (study of German ministry for traffic and infrastructure on benefits and needs regarding 
property rights for data). 
 182. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 15, at 964 (“The conceptualization of executive private facts as economically 
valuable trade secrets further expands on the macroeconomic trend of privacy commoditization.”); Rule, supra 
note 15, at 183; Samuelson, supra note 15, at 1125. 
 183. This balancing model is discussed in the context of propertizing information, particularly as intellectual 
property, in Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 23, 25 (2006). 
 184. Id. at 25–26. 
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and Digital Infrastructure called for the creation of “data ownership” as a means 
to create “data markets” and “data value harvesting.”185 Without property rights 
in data, companies are less willing to license or share data with other market 
participants, more likely to hold on to data that they possess and control and less 
likely to collect data in the first place.186 
But as shown in Part I, data has grown—and will continue to grow—at an 
exponential rate, and companies are racing to create ever more data, without any 
“incentivizing” through data propertization. “Open” data, completely without 
any property rights, has brought revolutionary advances for companies, 
scientific researchers, medical practitioners, intelligence operations, and many 
others,187 ranging countless industries and uses.188 In recent years, companies 
have developed various business models that do not rely on property rights (for 
example in the “sharing economy”)189 or rely on intellectual property laws to 
secure openness and turn their effects on their head (for example open source 
code licensing subject to “copyleft”).190 Companies hardly seem to need any 
further incentives to continue hoarding data. 
Whether the creation of property rights in data would encourage companies 
to share and trade data is far from certain. If global businesses had to deal with 
individual property rights (which would be national and territorial) on top of 
privacy and data protection regulations, this would further complicate legal 
compliance and cooperation arrangements. Data propertization would mean that 
individual data subjects and owners will have rights to exclude others from using 
or accessing that data, which will generally complicate and restrict the free flow 
of information. Individual data subjects may in many cases be identifiable more 
or less easily, but “data owners” could hold vague and nontransparent claims to 
information that would burden the administration of any “data market”  
 
 
 185. Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, supra note 17, at Part 4. 
 186. Id. at Parts 4, 5.1.3. 
 187. Randal E. Bryant et al., Big-Data Computing: Creating Revolutionary Breakthroughs in Commerce, 
Science, and Society, COMPUTING RES. ASS’N (Dec. 22, 2008), http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Big_Data.pdf 
(discussing how big data computing can and will transform various sectors). 
 188. Chloé Margulis, Note, The Application of Big Data Analytics to Patent Litigation, 99 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 305, 305, 340 (2017) (discussing the benefits of big data analytics to the patent 
industry); Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (2015) 
(“[A] data-driven systems approach has revolutionized other high-risk practices, from trauma surgery to space 
travel.”); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 393 (2014) 
(“We are on the cusp of a ‘Big Data’ Revolution. Increasingly large datasets are being mined for important 
predictions and often surprising insights. . . . The scale of the Big Data Revolution is such that all kinds of human 
activities and decisions are beginning to be influenced by big data predictions, including dating, shopping, 
medicine, education, voting, law enforcement, terrorism prevention, and cybersecurity. This transformation is 
comparable to the Industrial Revolution in the ways our pre-big data society will be left radically changed.”). 
 189. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality 
of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 279–80 (2004). 
 190. See Lothar Determann, Dangerous Liaisons—Software Combinations as Derivative Works? 
Distribution, Installation, and Execution of Linked Programs Under Copyright Law, Commercial Licenses, and 
the GPL, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1437–41, 1481 (2006) (“Programmers invented “copyleft” to fight copyright 
law, published a manifesto, and created a new set of license terms intended to free software . . . .”).  
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apparently considered by the German government. Based on experiences with 
patent and copyright trolls,191 businesses can expect data trolls to get in line to 
include data they own into studies and data bases to later extract ransoms and 
nuisance fees based on potential property rights in data. 
An example of where vesting property rights has slowed down the pace of 
research occurred in India when, in response to Western pharmaceutical 
companies’ patenting of products developed from natural resources, the Indian 
government enacted the Biological Diversity Act, requiring non-citizens and 
foreign corporate bodies not registered in India to obtain approvals from the 
National Biodiversity Authority before obtaining any biological resources in 
India.192 This had an unintended effect of “retarding the potential of [India] to 
reap the full rewards of biotechnology,” as well as “impeding conservation 
science.”193 
Data propertization may have negative effects on incentivizing creativity 
or technological advancements, which is why current property laws generally 
carve out data from protectable subject matter definitions, as shown in Part III. 
The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Graham v. John Deere Co. that the 
constitutional authority for Congress to grant patent rights194 is “limited to the 
promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts,’”195 which was interpreted as requiring 
“[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful 
knowledge.”196 The Court held that existent knowledge is none of those things 
and does not promote the advances in the useful arts, and that free access to 
materials that are already available should not be restricted.197 Similarly, in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained that no originality, which is a constitutional requirement for a 
copyright, can exist for any fact—whether it’s scientific, historical, biographical, 
or news of the day198—and that copyright law is meant to encourage “others to 
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”199 These 
seminal decisions suggest that granting new property rights akin to patent rights 
or copyrights (for example, granting rights to exclude others for a specified 
period of time) to data, which is factual and at best existent knowledge, would 
not promote innovation, advancement of useful knowledge, or public access to  
 
 
 191. See e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117, 2118–19 (2013). 
 192. Biological Diversity Act, No. 18 of 2003, INDIA CODE (2002), vol. 18. 
 193. Rohan Pethiyagoda, Biodiversity Law Has Had Some Unintended Effects, 429 NATURE 129, 129 
(2004); see also VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER?: UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
28 (2001). 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 195. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
 196. Id. at 6. 
 197. Id. at 5–6. 
 198. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 347, 348 (1991).  
 199. Id. at 349–50.  
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information. 
B.  PROTECTING PERSONAL PRIVACY 
The second posited rationale—protection of personal privacy—will also 
not be advanced by data propertization. Data privacy laws already afford 
individuals with a nuanced exclusion right, which lawmakers have structured to 
reflect policy interests in freedom of information and personal privacy with 
notice and consent requirements, a right to be forgotten, rights against 
international data transfers, and various other partial or complete exclusion 
rights. Data subjects could not benefit from an additional data collection or usage 
exclusion right under property laws, because such a right would be duplicative 
at best. Companies that acquire ownership to personal data from data subjects 
like other property could exclude the previous owner—the data subject—from 
using data about himself or herself. Such an exclusion right would be 
diametrically opposed to the policy objectives of data privacy laws, which seek 
to protect human dignity and personal privacy. 
Besides exclusionary rights, property laws typically also confer a right to 
possession, usage, and free disposition.200 Granting such rights with respect to 
personal data would also be highly counterproductive to the policy objectives of 
privacy laws. If data subjects could sell and transfer personal data like other 
property, the buyers could use and resell their data as they see fit. Individuals 
already benefit today from their ability to oppose data collection and usage under 
data privacy laws: companies have to offer attractive services, applications, or 
other items to gain access to user data in a highly competitive market for users 
on the Internet of Things. European policy makers bemoan that individuals are 
not compensated fairly enough for their data by “free” services and apps and 
want to strengthen individual data sovereignty by mandating that companies pay 
cash to individuals for their data.201 But, the administration (and surely taxation) 
of individual data compensation systems will inevitably create a need for even 
more data collection, processing, and bureaucracy. If law makers start 
mandating minimum wages for data subjects, companies will have to charge for 
formerly-free services and the individuals are unlikely to benefit from the 
theoretical option to refrain from selling their data. In many circumstances, a 
property owner will only be able to receive liability-rule protection—which 
means that the owner can be forced to give up her property (and privacy) in 
return for an externally-set compensation (often by a court, legislature, or 
administrative agency)202—and her properties may also be subject to 
government confiscation or interference without any compensation.203 
Further, if data can be sold, licensed, and traded like commodities, this  
 
 
 200. See supra Subpart III.A. 
 201. Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, supra note 17, at Part 4. 
 202. Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 69, 79 (2011).  
 203. See id.  
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would inevitably have negative effects on the protection of personal privacy. In 
fact, the ability to own and trade personal data can clash with other policies and 
jurisprudence on ownership relating to humans. Psychologist Raymond Cattell, 
defines personality as “that which permits a prediction of what a person will do 
in a given situation.”204 Personal data allows companies, individuals and 
algorithms to predict many aspects of a person’s actions, such as where that 
person wants to go or what that person wants to eat. Proponents of property 
rights to data at the core of an individual’s personality to encourage trade 
invokes policy arguments against the propertization of humans as discussed in 
the jurisprudence surrounding ownership of human bodily tissue205 as well as in 
human rights and international humanitarian law discourse.206 
Protection of personal privacy is and can be sufficiently, if not better, 
achieved with data privacy laws, which are designed specifically to address 
personal privacy issues.207 For example, in the EU, as discussed in Subpart II.A, 
the legislature put into effect the new GDPR to strengthen individual 
information self-determination by requiring companies to minimize the 
collection, use, and retention of personal data and by broadly defining “personal 
data” to cover most categories of data generated by connected devices. Personal 
privacy is and can be better protected with data privacy laws demanding data 
minimization, deletion, and protection—as opposed to property laws, 
incentivizing investment and maximization of profits from data collection, 
sharing, and trading. 
C.  FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SPEECH 
Granting property rights to data undermines the freedom of expression. As 
explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., information 
qualifies as speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.208 The Court 
stated, “Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is 
most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.”209 
Data propertization—which would allow individuals or companies to control  
 
 
 204. RAYMOND B. CATTELL, PERSONALITY: A SYSTEMATIC THEORETICAL AND FACTUAL STUDY 2 (1950) 
(emphasis removed). 
 205. See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990) (holding that a person does 
cannot retain ownership interest in his spleen as it was a naturally occurring organism). 
 206. Press Release, Secretary General, Abolition of Slavery in All Its Forms Remains Major United Nations 
Priority, Says Secretary General, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/8519-HR/4629-OBV/309 (Nov. 22, 2002), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SGSM8519.doc.htm (“Human beings are not property.”). 
 207. Many scholars debate whether data privacy laws need to be reformed, but that is not a topic considered 
in this Article. But data privacy laws, whether in their current or amended form, are designed for protecting 
personal privacy and are more suitable for protecting personal privacy. 
 208. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–71 (2011) (“There is a strong presumption that 
prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes.” (emphasis added)); see also Jane 
Baubauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (2014) (“Privacy laws rely on the unexamined assumption 
that the collection of data is not speech. That assumption is incorrect.”). 
 209. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.  
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access to their data—would restrict data collection and thus hamper the free flow 
of information.210 Thus, “putting a fact into the ownership of only one person, 
or allowing an entity who generates a fact . . . to control how it is used” creates 
“pernicious dangers” against the freedom of expression.211 
D.  GOVERNMENT USE OF DATA 
Restricting information flows could also significantly hinder public 
governance and law enforcement. As a particularly illustrative and recent 
example, police officers in a number of U.S. states are required to wear body 
cameras while on duty, where the recordings are available for inspection as 
public records.212 This is part of an important public policy move to enhance 
transparency within law enforcement bodies and reduce risks of abusive police 
practices or unjustified complaints against the police. If police officers and 
citizens had property rights to the body camera footage, the usage of such 
cameras would be greatly complicated. Individual could exclude the public from 
such data, impeding the basic precepts of transparency and accountability that 
underline this public policy. Many other government uses of data would 
similarly be impeded by the creation of property rights in data for individuals 
and potentially companies that buy data from individuals, including census, 
statistics, taxes, licenses, etc. 
E.  COMPETITION 
Likewise, “information propertization is designed to restrict competition, 
if not always by creating economic ‘monopolies,’ at least by enhancing the 
position of one competitor vis-à-vis others.”213 For example, ownership in data 
means that potential users of that data must either purchase access rights from 
the owner or attempt to gather the desired information themselves.214 Under the 
second scenario, if the data is a “sole-source data,” the owner will not be limited 
by a price ceiling, which can foreclose all other persons from the possibility of 
gathering the data independently.215 This can result in monopolies in data and  
 
 
 210. See id. at 580 (holding that a state regulation violated the First Amendment because it “burdened a 
form of protected expression that it found too persuasive,” while leaving “unburdened those speakers whose 
messages are in accord with [the statute]”); Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: 
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 75 (2015) 
(“[O]ther scholars recognize that restrictions on data collection are restrictions on the free flow of information, 
which implicate the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 211. Symposium, Data Protection Statutes and Bioinformatic Databases, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 171, 
182 (2002).  
 212. See Body-Worn Camera Laws Database: State Body-Worn Camera Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/body-worn-cameras-
interactive-graphic.aspx#/ (providing a clickable diagram detailing various states’ body camera laws). 
 213. Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 23, 28 (2006). 
 214. Symposium, supra note 211, at 182. 
 215. Id. 
F - DETERMANN_25 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:55 AM 
40 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
hurt competition. In fact, there are already attempts to monopolize data, which 
would only get worse with data propertization. For example, “sports leagues 
increasingly seek to control the dissemination of real-time data in conjunction 
with lucrative distribution agreements,”216 given that real-time information on 
sporting events are disseminated through several media,217 sports leagues’ 
ownership in the real-time information will further undermine the competition 
from those other mediums. 
F.  SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS 
Some proponents for data propertization argue that individuals should be 
able to economically benefit from their data (for example, by receiving monetary 
compensation).218 But, consent requirements under privacy and publicity laws 
already create opportunities for individuals to monetize their statutory choice 
(by withholding consent except in consideration for valuable services or other 
benefits), without incentivizing an outright market where individuals transfer 
ownership to their data to companies, which could then exclude anyone—
including the data subjects and their friends and families—from using data to 
which the companies have acquired property rights. 
Even if some individuals were able to demand better consideration for their 
data, most people will likely lose out. Businesses would have to find alternative 
sources of funding to pay data subjects and this could ultimately result in 
disadvantages for consumers. Companies developed many innovative services 
based on advertising and data-based business models, such as Internet search 
engines, mobile maps, social networks, video sharing, and consumer reviews, 
which would never have been able to gain critical mass based on for-pay models. 
If companies have to switch to for-pay models, because they become unable to 
run service-for-data models, large parts of the population may lose access to 
services because they cannot afford them anymore or find the time to focus on 
personal data monetization to generate additional income. 
The present discussion in Germany regarding data propertization also 
provides valuable insight. As developing countries have made attempts to 
protect natural resources from exploitation by European explorers in the past, 
European countries seem now intent on protecting personal data as the “fuel of 
the digital economy” for European enterprises today.219 In this context, data 
 
 216. Ryan M. Rodenbert et al., Real-Time Sports Data and the First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & 
ARTS 63, 63 (2015). 
 217. Id. at 65. 
 218. See Laudon, supra note 15 at 93 (“[I]n which individuals can receive fair compensation for the use of 
information about themselves. This step is necessary because of the continued erosion of privacy brought about 
by technological change, institutional forces, and the increasingly outdated legal foundation of privacy 
protection.”). The notion that individuals should have the right to own and control data about themselves may 
have become more popular in reaction to the Snowden disclosures relating to mass data collections around the 
world. 
 219. In the EU, politicians debate whether a special right in data should be created as part of the EU’s Digital 
Single Market project. European Commission, supra note 158, at 2–3. 
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ownership rights are not claimed for data subjects, but for companies ab initio.220 
German scholars have noted that the present movements for data propertization 
are thinly-disguised attempts to protect the German car manufacturing industry 
from being disrupted by U.S. technology companies and likened the situation to 
the previously unsuccessful efforts made by German newspapers and public 
broadcasting institutions against search engine aggregators.221 In 2013, the 
German Parliament passed an ancillary copyright law aimed at search engine 
aggregators, in which news and magazine publishers were given exclusive 
property rights to make press products available to the public unless they 
qualified as short text excerpts.222 In response, leading search providers 
“rendered the legislation all but meaningless” by carrying only the news of 
publishers who agreed to waive those exclusive property rights,223 ultimately 
causing more disruptions in the German market. The possibility of any 
legislation on data ownership being similarly circumvented and making a 
negative impact is another consideration that should be taken into account when 
determining whether there should be property rights in data. 
G.  NORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OBSTACLES 
Besides the lack of compelling reasons for property rights, and the 
significant policy concerns against creating property rights, any new data 
property rights regime would face insurmountable implementation obstacles. 
For example, if sensors on a car owned by a company (for example a taxi 
company) generate various “valuable” data relating to the driver (in this 




 220. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel raised the question whether vehicle manufacturers or 
software developers own data generated by connected cars, but not considering that car owners, drivers or 
passengers could instead be entitled to own such data. See Video-Podcast, supra note 181. In contrast, the 
German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI) released a strategy paper in March 
2017, according to which an individual person should have sovereignty over her own data. Wir brauchen ein 
Datengesetz in Deutschland!: Strategiepapier Digitale Souveraenitaet, BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR VERKEHR 
UND DIGITALE INFRASTRUKTUR, http://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/DG/datengesetz.html (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2018) (Ger.) (stating that data is not a “thing” and thus cannot be “owned” in the legal sense under 
current German property law, but that BMVI wants to develop a solution that leads to an equal treatment of data 
and things by creating a legal environment in which data can be strictly allocated to an individual or a company 
as the “owner” of such data). German Interior Minister, Thomas de Maizière, on the other hand stated that he is 
against a concept of data ownership in general. Guest Commentary Thomas de Maizière, DER TAGESSPIEGEL 
(Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/data-debates-datenschutz-ist-kein-selbstzweck/ 
19391956.html. 
 221. Hornung & Goeble, supra note 17, at 268. 
 222. See Greg Sterling, German “Ancillary Copyright” Law to Go into Effect, Imposes Limits on Search 
Results, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 16, 2013), https://searchengineland.com/german-ancillary-copyright-to-
go-into-effect-imposes-limits-on-search-results-159843 (new law required Google and others that index or 
aggregate news to pay for links or excepts for those news items). 
 223. Matthew Karnitschnig & Chris Spillane, Plan to Make Google Pay for News Hits Rocks, POLITICO 
(Feb. 15, 2017, 7:36 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/plan-to-make-google-pay-for-news-hits-rocks-
copyright-reform-european-commission/. See generally Hornung & Goeble, supra note 17, at 265. 
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various people that come into the proximity of the car (people crossing the street 
in front of the taxi), who would have ownership rights in that data? 
Governments, businesses, and individuals would need to claim broad exceptions 
to broad data property rights in the interest of free speech, information freedom, 
safety, and security, and courts would inevitably get entangled in litigation that 
would require constant weighing of property versus speech rights and constant 
censorship of speech and information flow. Data subjects who successfully sell 
their data would have to keep accounts for income received and pay taxes. 
Collective rights societies may come into existence and create new 
bureaucracies and paperwork. Every data trader would constantly have to issue 
privacy notices to data subjects or obtain renewed consent, provide individual 
access, grant portability honor objections and comply with requests to be 
forgotten under the EU GDPR. To avoid these and other practical problems, data 
should be left to the public domain, a concept rooted in Roman law as res nullius, 
which means “property of no one,” or res communis, “a public good.”224 
CONCLUSION 
No one owns225 or should own226 data as such.227 
Data as such—the content of information—exists conceptually separate 
from works of authorship and data bases (which can be subject to intellectual 
property rights), physical embodiments of information (data on a computer chip, 
which can be subject to personal property rights; warning symbol painted on a 
road, which can be subject to real property rights) and physical objects or 
intangible items to which information relates (a dangerous malfunctioning 
vehicle to which the warnings on road markings or a computer chip relate).228 
Lawmakers have granted property rights to different persons regarding works of 
authorship, data bases, chattels, land and other items for the purpose of 
incentivizing investments and improvements, a purpose that does not exist with 
respect to data as such.229 
Individual persons, businesses, governments, and the public at large have 
different interests in data and access restrictions.230 These interests are protected 
by an intricate net of existing laws that deliberately refrain from granting 
property rights in data. Existing property laws intentionally exclude data from  
 
 
 224. Christopher R. Rossi, ‘A Unique International Problem’: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and 
Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 93, 117 
n.150 (2016).  
 225. See supra Part III. 
 226. See supra Part VI. 
 227. See supra Part II for distinction regarding information content, expression, physical manifestation of 
data and information objects. 
 228.  See supra Part II. 
 229.  See supra Parts III, VI. 
 230.  See supra Part IV. 
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subject matter definitions.231 Existing data-related laws and property laws 
balance interests in data and access restrictions based on public policy 
considerations that would be impaired by a creation of property rights in data. 
New property rights in data are not suited to promote better privacy or more 
innovation or technological advances, but would more likely suffocate free 
speech, information freedom, science, and technological progress. The 
rationales for propertizing data are not compelling and are outweighed by 





































 231.  See supra Part V. 
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